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At the end of March, the negotiations that started in June 2021 on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) were successfully concluded, reflecting radical changes in British trade priorities after Brexit. More broadly, this move by London undoubtedly confirms the special importance that the Indo-Pacific region has acquired in the concept of "Global Britain" and in its subsequent relevant updates. The signing ceremony is scheduled for July 2023, for which the trade ministers of the participating countries and the United Kingdom will meet in Auckland (New Zealand). As a result of London's accession, this bloc will surpass the EU in terms of the combined population of its constituent countries. However, unlike the European Union, which the United Kingdom, on the contrary, left, the CPTPP does not have - to the satisfaction of British Eurosceptics - its own court like the EU Court of Justice, or a supranational budget. The union operates as a multinational trade agreement. An important obstacle that hindered reaching an agreement more quickly was London's refusal to weaken national food standards. But in the end, Ottawa (Canada) backed down on calls for London to lift the ban on importing beef with growth hormones. Beijing has also applied for membership in the CPTPP following London (the Chinese application is dated September 16, 2021, but negotiations have not yet begun). However, with London's accession as a full member of the agreement, China's chances of joining the bloc look somewhat weaker, as London is likely to obtain veto power on this issue. It is possible that they will use this veto under the pretext of ensuring higher trade standards within the agreement (including issues related to ecology and food safety). In any case, as It is known, the current British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak refers to China as a "systemic challenge", which London intends to respond to with "dynamic pragmatism." Currently, the CPTPP includes 11 states (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam), none of which are European. These countries collectively account for 13% of global GDP. The new partnership replaced the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement of 2016 with 12 participants, after former US President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the agreement in 2017. In 2020, the 11 countries of the CPTPP accounted for 8.4% of goods and services exported from the United Kingdom. In turn, 6.8% of imports to the United Kingdom came from these countries. The terms of the Trans-Pacific Partnership eliminate unnecessary barriers to mutual trade of services by opening financial markets and reducing obstacles to cross-border investment, facilitating data exchange, increasing business mobility, and ensuring regulatory transparency. All of this will support the British government's plans to turn the country into a global technology and service hub, strengthen semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains to produce electric vehicles and wind turbines.London already has trade agreements with most members of this trading bloc, but now these relationships can deepen, and 99% of British goods exported to the bloc countries will be subject to zero import tariffs. Tariffs on imports of Peruvian bananas, Vietnamese rice, crab sticks from Singapore, and Malaysian palm oil into the UK will be reduced (this is a controversial issue that has sparked discussion in the UK, as the production of palm oil, as ecologists point out, leads to deforestation of tropical forests). At the same time, according to assessments by the British government itself, joining the CPTPP is expected to add no more than 0.08% per year to the country's economic growth in the long term (while the slowdown in growth due to Brexit is estimated at 4%). Many politicians and trade experts rightfully point out that participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership is not capable of compensating for the economic losses that the UK is experiencing due to its departure from the EU. Moreover, due to differences in its rules and standards from European regulations, Britain's accession will prevent it from returning to the European Union in case of a change of priorities. In other words, this agreement is like driving an additional wedge into the relationship between London and Brussels, which are just starting to improve. It is worth remembering in this regard that it was Liz Truss, a former trade minister in Boris Johnson's cabinet and one of the main advocates of independence from the EU, who submitted the British application to join the CPTPP. So far, for London, it is not so much a direct economic, but rather a strategic and symbolic acquisition, firstly due to the rapid growth (according to some estimates, up to 65% by 2030) in the number of middle-class consumers in a dynamically developing region, committed to innovation, and secondly, because of the fact that in the foreseeable future, mid-ranking trading powers such as Thailand and South Korea, which have already submitted applications, are planning to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Membership in the TPP is becoming more important for Britain due to the unattainability of a large trade agreement with the United States and the crisis in the World Trade Organization, which is currently unable to firmly enforce the rules of global trade. The matter is not limited to trade alone as London's foreign policy is clearly shifting towards the Indo-Pacific region. In this sense, Australia and Japan, concerned about economic pressure from China and its military ambitions, see Great Britain as a natural ally in opposing Beijing. It is assumed that stronger economic ties will lead to the strengthening of geostrategic alliances. Due to the high dependence of countries such as Chile on Beijing, which is the largest trading partner and main investor for Chileans, Britain's participation in the CPTPP, according to London's opinion, will contribute to the establishment of necessary connections that are seen by Britain's partners in the region as an attractive alternative to ties with China.

Australia plays a pivotal role in global Lithium supply chains. While joining initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership may in the short term provide strategic security, this must be weighed against the broader interests of global development and climate change mitigation.  Lithium is both a critical element and strategic resource as nations strive to achieve their decarbonisation goals. Amid increasing geopolitical tensions, nationalism, and protectionism, investments in strategic resources are subject to security reviews to assess potential political risks and safeguard national security interests. Such scrutiny reflects the growing importance of protecting critical resources and assets as countries strive to maintain their sovereignty in an uncertain global environment where trust and adherence to a rules-based order are diminishing. China currently dominates the global lithium supply chain with over 60 percent of processing capacity, 65 percent of lithium-ion battery component manufacturing, and 77 percent of battery manufacturing. The concentration of the lithium supply chain in China has raised concerns in the United States (US) and the European Union, resulting in a shared priority of reducing dependence on China in their respective industrial and trade policies. Accounting for 55 percent of global lithium production – with 96 percent of it exported to China in 2022 – Australia holds a significant position in the “de-risking” effort of the US-led Minerals Security Partnership, which aims to strengthen commercial ties between strategically aligned nations. Australian Resources Minister Madeleine King has emphasised the importance that Australia participate in this alliance. Jim Chalmers, Australia’s Treasurer, has called for caution and selectivity in foreign investments in critical minerals. While not explicitly stated, it is evident that Australia intends to impose restrictions on investments from China in critical minerals. At the recent G7 Summit in Japan, President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reached an agreement to build an independent supply chain for critical minerals. As part of this agreement, Australian companies will have the opportunity to benefit from US subsidies if they establish value-adding facilities within Australia. Building onshore lithium processing facilities in Australia can provide benefits such as reduced shipping costs and job creation. However, it requires significant investment in building processing technology and waste management facilities. Meanwhile, aligning with the US-led alliance could risk escalating tensions with the potential for retaliation from China. But, accepting China’s investment and technology for onshore lithium processing may raise concerns about aligning with China’s political identity. The definition of “likemindedness” and the alignment of interests in foreign investment have become subject to debate. Tianqi Lithium, a Chinese company, portrayed itself as a “likeminded” foreign investor during its attempt to acquire equity in ASX-listed Essential Metals (ESS), emphasising its potential contribution to Australia’s moving up the value chain. However, this interpretation contradicts the evolving understanding of the term held by Australian politicians and the public, which is more narrowly focused on political identity. Benefits and costs Within this competition, a primary concern is that China will leverage its dominant position as a geopolitical  “chokepoint,” similar to the way Russia did over energy resources during its invasion of Ukraine. However, reciprocity is also true in a chokepoint strategy due to interdependence. Possessing eight percent of known global lithium reserves, China relies on imports for about 65 percent of its lithium production. This dependence exposes China to its own potential chokepoint. In this respect, Australia plays a pivotal role in China’s supply chain security. The fear of being “strangled” in the supply of lithium has led to a growing  security dilemma – nations strive to secure a stable and uninterrupted supply for decarbonisation efforts; however, this pursuit  could trigger a cycle of competition for production and processing capacity, potentially resulting in redundancy in the supply chain and, more importantly, increased pollution. The US, despite being a major consumer of lithium batteries, has limited control over the global lithium supply, with only one percent of known lithium reserves. To ensure energy security during the clean energy transition, the United States is actively pursuing strategies to strengthen its position in the lithium supply chain. This may involve decoupling or de-risking strategies that come with economic, social, and environmental costs but can provide advantages in terms of global influence, political leadership, and technology sovereignty compared to China. While clean energy technologies like solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles offer carbon-neutral benefits during use, their production processes can have a substantial environmental impact – lithium extraction and processing, for example, is energy-intensive and can contribute to carbon emissions. A recent opinion article in Nature highlights the importance of considering the entire life cycle of clean energy technologies, from production to application, to effectively mitigate their environmental impact. Driven by the need for energy security and its commitment to achieving its carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals, China has made remarkable strides in developing clean energy technologies over the past decade. Notably, China has gained a significant advantage across the supply chain. This competitive edge has been achieved through substantial investment in research and development, but also significant environmental costs. In 2022, China’s investment in clean energy technology exceeded – by more than 50 percent – that of all of the G7 nations, plus South Korea, and India, combined. China is strategically investing in future technologies, including the full cycle of lithium production. Chinese lithium giants are constructing solar power stations for clean lithium extraction in South America, and Chinese researchers are working on battery recycling technologies and exploring new materials and innovative processes in battery making. Riding on an established wheel or inventing a new one? When it comes to fighting climate change and the urgent need for action, nations have the choice to build upon established technologies or explore new ones. Countries need to adopt an open-minded approach and avoid repeating past mistakes that have harmed the environment in the search for sustainable solutions. This requires a global effort based on collaboration and cooperation, transcending political divisions. China, as a developing country, has benefited from technology transfer and foreign investment during its industrialisation. In the emerging area of clean energy transition, it has gained first-mover advantages, although it has incurred significant costs, especially environmental damage. Chinese investment is often referred to as “red capital,” indicating the potential for political influence, particularly by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in foreign investment projects. Though most of Chinese lithium companies are private businesses, they are still collectively categorised as red capital, and not viewed as likeminded investors. It would be short-sighted to reject Chinese technologies and investments solely on the basis of political divisions. Instead, countries should learn from both the successes and challenges of China’s experience to achieve their decarbonisation goals. For Australia, it is important to go beyond simplistic policies and carefully assess the benefits and costs of joining a US-centered geopolitical bloc in the lithium supply chain. Such a decision could have repercussions, including retaliations and disruptions in global supply chains and trade. Moreover, it is crucial to both fully assess the environmental consequences and carefully calculate the necessary investments in technology and infrastructure in order to develop a strategic plan that benefits Australia, contributes to global decarbonisation efforts, and promotes the well-being of humanity.

A week-long trip to Beijing by the Pacific’s most flamboyant statesman Manasseh Sogavare, was always going to cause concern in Canberra. The substance of the visit was as expected. The relationship between China and the Solomon Islands was upgraded to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (on par with Papua New Guinea, the first Pacific nation to sign up to the Belt and Road Initiative). Nine agreements were also signed covering everything from civil aviation and infrastructure to fisheries and tourism. The Chinese premier, Li Qiang, who inked the deals with Sogavare, made a point of not mentioning the controversial policing cooperation agreement, the draft of which was leaked more than a year ago to New Zealand academic Anna Powles. Despite repeated calls from Australia and New Zealand to release the text of the policing agreement, there is no indication the Chinese or the Solomon Islands leadership will do so. There were also moments of theatre in Sogavare’s trip. The prime minister declared “I’m back home” when he arrived in Beijing in a clip posted by China Global Television Network. He then said in a longer interview on the same network that his nation had been “on the wrong side of history” for the 36 years it recognised Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China, and lauded President Xi Jinping as a “great man”. Sogavare saved his biggest serve for his return to the Solomon Islands, though. He accused Australia and New Zealand of withdrawing crucial budget support and hinted he would look to China to fulfil his ambitions to establish an armed forces, should Australia be unwilling to help.China’s slow start in the PacificSome key questions have been overlooked this week in the pantomime about what Australia should or shouldn’t do to shore up its relationship with an important Pacific partner. (We could start by accepting that Sogavare will never love us, and avoid getting into an arms race in the Solomon Islands with China.) What’s been somewhat lost, though, is how China has made inroads so quickly in a region that it still officially classifies as “peripheral”. China has certainly had to work harder to gain a foothold in the region. Relative to other regions, it has a lack of historical state ties with the Pacific. In Africa and Southeast Asia, China can draw on memories of shared anti-colonial struggles and aid projects like the Tanzam railway. In the Pacific, the Chinese Communist Party is a latecomer. Also holding it back is the remoteness and small population of the region. This has not made the Pacific a good fit for China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has flourished in countries with rapid transport and communication links, substantial Chinese diasporas and leaders who are easily reached. Most of China’s own Pacific experts were baffled when the region was belatedly included in the project. Yet despite these obstacles, it’s clear the Chinese state’s approach in the Pacific has shifted, most remarkably in its diplomacy and the role state-linked companies are expected to play. Diplomats with serious intent China’s wolf warrior diplomacy has received plenty of attention, but the picture in the Pacific is less straightforward. The recently appointed special envoy to the Pacific, Qian Bo, undoubtedly styles himself as a wolf warrior. Under his tenure as Fijian ambassador, a Taiwanese representative was assaulted by Chinese diplomats for the crime of displaying a Taiwanese flag cake. Yet, other appointments suggest China is appointing higher-calibre diplomats to the region. These include Li Ming, the current ambassador to the Solomon Islands, and Xue Bing, the former ambassador to Papua New Guinea who now holds the challenging post of special envoy to the Horn of Africa. With experience in the region and good language skills, these diplomats have been more able to engage with Pacific communities than their predecessors, who largely focused on sending good news back to Beijing. More serious representatives suggest more serious intent.Chinese companies exerting influence, tooChina’s state-linked companies remain the driving force behind China’s engagement with the Pacific. Unlike the embassies, they are well-resourced and have skin in the game. Many company men (in construction, where Chinese companies dominate, they’re mostly men) are based in the region for decades, developing a deep understanding of how to win projects and influence political elites. Failed projects generate plenty of headlines, but many companies – such as COVEC PNG and China Railway First Group – are effective operators. They are building infrastructure cheaply in the Pacific and winning the favour of multilateral donors, particularly the Asian Development Bank. For larger state-linked companies, like China Harbor Engineering Company and the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC), the geopolitical game has shifted. In the past, they could rely on their standing within the Chinese political system (their parent companies often outrank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) to resist pressure to act on behalf of state. Now, they are expected to carry geopolitical water for Beijing. Often this can benefit the companies. For instance, when CCECC lobbied the Solomon Islands leadership to switch their allegiance from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China, it helped the company when it came to bidding for projects for the Pacific Games in Honiara. The leaders of these companies realise it can harm their image when they are seen as Beijing’s pawns. Yet, the companies, diplomats and Pacific leaders who choose Beijing’s embrace know times have changed. China is now a serious player in the region with a development philosophy to sell. It’s no longer enough to read Beijing’s talking points. You have to look like you mean it.