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Energy & Economics
Concept of the trade war between the USA and China.

How to better equip the U.S. DFC to compete with China

by Andrew Herscowitz

한국어로 읽기 Читать на русском Leer en español Gap In Deutsch lesen اقرأ بالعربية Lire en français When U.S. President Biden and Chinese President Xi met in November 2023, Biden remarked that the countries must “ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.” A recent ODI report Hedging belts, de-risking roads: Sinosure’s role in China’s overseas finance illustrates the scale of the competition and reveals how one of China’s less-known institutions – Sinosure – has been giving China the edge. This blog offers some thoughts about how the U.S., through its U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) can better compete. Competing requires resources, but really not as much as you think Competing credibly requires money, dedicated staff, and creativity. It requires studying the competition. Infrastructure development requires low-cost financing, capacity-building, and getting everyone aligned. As Sinosure has demonstrated again and again, deploying guarantees and insurance – particularly from official financing – can de-risk overseas investment, reducing costs of finance and mobilising commercial investment from the private sector. When it comes to infrastructure, China has a far more robust, albeit imperfect, track record when compared to others. The U.S. and its G7 partners have not been much of a match for China in financing infrastructure worldwide. The G7 could successfully compete with China, and doing so does not have to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. The U.S. Congress, despite its strong desire to counter BRI, has yet to appropriate the resources necessary to compete credibly in a battle of influence against China in developing countries. There’s been plenty of rhetoric, repurposing of existing programs and resources into initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) and the Global Gateway. Each time the U.S. launches a new overseas economic development initiative, however, it rarely dedicates sufficient resources to help it scale – examples include the Partnership for Growth, Power Africa, Prosper Africa, and PGII. When it was fully funded, Power Africa, which coordinated the efforts of 12 U.S. government agencies, helped 120 power projects in Africa get across the finish line in just a few years, building a strong brand for the U.S. in Africa for economic development for the first time in decades. Then the U.S. cut Power Africa’s budget by 75% because of political shifts. The initiative stalled in its progress on new infrastructure, while still helping 200 million Africans get access to more reliable electricity. PGII, which has no dedicated budget, involves a handful of smart people working hard to deliver on a G7 promise of $600 billion in global infrastructure by 2025. Other than the Lobito Corridor project, it has not been clear to date what PGII is able to deliver at scale in Africa without additional resources. That could be about to change, though. The State Department just requested another $4 billion from Congress to up its game against China, which should help tremendously if that funding is secured to support PGII. Why Sinosure has been such an effective tool for China, despite its low margins BRI has not been particularly innovative, but it’s been steady. Sinosure, along with other Chinese export credit agencies, offers highly favorable terms and longer-term finance – this approach has well suited Global South governments in advancing their development and political objectives. While some projects have been problematic, Chinese creditors have provided the low-cost, patient capital at scale that many countries need for long-term productive infrastructure investment. But as the report shows, this approach has challenged established regimes governing the use of public money (link to blog 2). Sinosure insurance covers non-payment up to 95% of the insured equity or debt for up to 20 years, but most OECD Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) only provide 85% coverage for up to 10 years – though this policy soon will soon change [link to blog 2] Sinosure can work anywhere, except where there’s a live conflict or in cases of repayment arrears. By contrast, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has a list of over 100 countries where it cannot do business. Sinosure’s premiums max out at 7% of the total debt servicing cost of a project, making it relatively cost-effective. In this aspect, it is surprisingly transparent. DFC’s fees and costs are numerous and opaque, with DFC passing some of its own costs on to its clients. By the end of 2022, Sinosure had provided over $1.3 trillion-worth of insurance on export and investment, with a quarter of this going only to BRI countries. In 2022 alone, it supported a total portfolio of $900 billion through its insurance for over 170,000 clients, of which $80bn went to overseas investment and long-term finance, which mostly supports projects in infrastructure such as power, transportation, construction, telecoms and shipping. It received a total net insurance premium of $1.9 billion and paid out $1.5 billion in insurance claims. Despite its significant payouts, however, Sinosure continues to earn a modest profit of $102 million – not much of a margin, but enough to propel China’s global leadership on trade and infrastructure development.     By contrast, DFC’s current total portfolio-wide exposure is $41 billion, with just over $9.3 billion committed in fiscal year 2023 for 132 transactions – of which only around $3.5bn of this was for guarantees and risk insurance. DFC has many of the same tools available to it as the Chinese government, and DFC is not even legally required to earn a return on its investments. Yet DFC has not made full use of its capital resources and has not deployed its capacity for risk-mitigation finance in the same way. An unleashed DFC could make the U.S. more competitive It’s not too late for the U.S. and others to compete. The U.S. has an opportunity to further change how it conducts business to compete with China, while promoting sustainable development. DFC is starting to flex its competitive muscles with its own insurance product, recently using political risk insurance to support a $1.6 billion debt-for-nature swap in Ecuador and another $500 million debt-for-nature swap in Gabon, which support broader debt relief efforts, as well as channelling money towards climate and conservation goals. Moreover, those deals come at a very low cost to the U.S. government given DFC’s pricing models. DFC is up for reauthorisation in 2025. It has both foreign policy and development mandates. In a previous blog, we laid out 10 recommendations about how DFC could be more effective in achieving its development mandate. Here are 9 recommendations to help DFC be more effective in competing with China and achieving its foreign policy mandate: 1. Spend some money and spend it right All it took for Sinosure’s expansion in the early 2010s was a capital injection of $3 billion. To make its financial institutions just as competitive, the U.S. only needs to commit a few extra billion dollars of appropriated resources per year, just as State Department has proposed, not hundreds of billions. Sinosure, with its somewhat loose investment criteria, still managed to earn over $100 million profit on a $900 billion portfolio in 2022. Even if DFC were to spend $1 billion/year of additional budgetary resources – for the purpose of leveling the playing field with China and providing developing countries with the type of inexpensive financing they need – that could be money well spent for the U.S. taxpayer. That money could cover legal fees that DFC currently passes on to clients. It could be deployed through innovative instruments: to take on some of the currency risk on strategic transactions, to cover first loss on strategic investments, or to provide technical assistance that does not need to get repaid–comparative advantages that Chinese financial institutions still sorely lack. That funding also could be used, simply, to reduce interest rates and fees, at a time when borrowing costs for lower-income countries have risen astronomically. 2. Structure deals to outcompete China Encourage DFC to structure transactions to use its funding to maximize competition with China in a way that promotes a more level playing field. DFC should not crowd out competitively tendered and transparent private sector investment, but where inexpensive or even concessional DFC co-financing might help the private sector out-compete opaque Chinese investment, DFC should be equipped to support those projects. 3. Don’t obsess over returns Even though DFC is not legally required to earn a return on a portfolio-wide basis, most members of Congress expect DFC to be revenue neutral to the U.S. Treasury. If members of Congress would adjust their return expectations even slightly, DFC could significantly advance its development and foreign policy goals. Effective development and foreign policy are not free – especially when competing with China. Even earning back $.95 on the dollar on a portfolio-wide basis would be a significant leverage of 1:20 of appropriated resources to private investment – giving DFC broad flexibility to structure deals that prioritise development impact and foreign policy. 4. Remove DFC’s limits Eliminate ceilings on DFC financing – including the $1 billion transaction limit, the $10 billion annual portfolio limit, and the $60 billion total portfolio exposure. It really doesn’t cost anything to do this. It’s like raising its credit card limit. 5. Let DFC work anywhere when necessary Give DFC the authority to determine the countries where it can do business on a case-by-case basis, depending on what the foreign policy and development priorities are. DFC should be required to continue to prioritize investments in low and lower-middle income countries, but it should have flexibility to respond quickly and selectively anywhere that doing so will credibly advance a compelling U.S. national security interest, such as financing a strategic port or lithium processing. To prevent DFC from sliding into becoming just a national security tool, abandoning its development mandate, DFC should be required to clearly articulate the compelling national security interests of projects and should provide a detailed report to Congress each year on its investments in upper-middle income and high-income countries to explain these interests (even classified, if necessary). 6. Empower DFC to support “nearshoring” DFC can help the U.S. diversify its supply chains and reduce dependencies on China. To encourage companies to move operations out of China and into the Americas (if operating in the U.S. is not commercially viable), give DFC broader authority to support strategic transactions in the region. 7. Make it easier for DFC to support equity investments in strategic infrastructure When DFC takes an equity position in a company or an investment fund, it gets a seat at the ownership table. That allows DFC to drive decisions regarding sourcing of goods and services (i.e., making sure contracts do not always go to Chinese companies). Investing in equity funds that develop and finance a portfolio of infrastructure projects is an effective way for DFC to increase and spread its strategic influence -- except that DFC often struggles to make these types of investments because U.S. legal requirements make DFC a slow and clunky, and hence, an unattractive investment partner. DFC needs flexibility to bypass some of these requirements. 8. Help DFC scale its risk insurance instrument For years, DFC has been hugely innovative in deploying its insurance products to leverage capital from others. DFC used its political risk insurance tool to crowd in private investment in Ukraine, and to catalyze pioneering debt-for-nature swaps worth hundreds of millions of dollars in Ecuador and Belize. But according to recent reports, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget has been threatening to start treating insurance investments like guarantee instruments from a budgeting standpoint. This will make it more expensive for DFC to deploy this tool. If it ain’t broke, why fix it? As we’ve shown, one of the main factors behind China’s competitiveness abroad is through Sinosure’s expansive use of its insurance tool: OMB’s changes will make it more expensive and difficult for the U.S. to scale its own. OMB needs to read the room. We’re not going to suddenly balance the U.S. budget by tinkering with a formula that has worked for decades. Let DFC do more of what it does well. 9. Help speed DFC up Before committing any transaction over $10 million, DFC is required to notify Congress in advance. This “Congressional notification” requirement provides a valuable extra level of oversight to ensure that DFC does not doing anything out-of-whack with Congressional priorities. But the process slows DFC down, when Chinese financiers are known for their speed. Even though DFC only is required to “notify” Congress of its deals, and not seek “approval,” practically and politically speaking nobody wants to run afoul of any one of the 535 members of Congress. Consequently, DFC rarely moves forward on a project until it can resolve the concerns of members of Congress. DFC needs to work with Congress to come up with a reasonable alternative to the Congressional notification process that balances speed with continued close collaboration with Congress. In addition, DFC’s Board can help speed things up by focusing its efforts on high level policy guidance instead of individual transactions. The Board should delegate more decision making on individual deals to DFC’s CEO. It makes no sense for the Secretary of State, who chairs DFC’s Board, to dig into a $20 million investment into a healthcare fund, not to mention the hundreds of State Department staff with little development finance experience who review the documentation before it goes to the Secretary with a recommendation for a vote. U.S. taxpayers probably would prefer to have the State Department focus on resolving the Middle East conflict. From the perspective of many Global South countries, this competition between the G7 countries and China is not inherently bad if it brings them more desperately needed resources and improves the quality of their infrastructure. The U.S. could be more competitive if it empowered its development finance professionals to use DFC’s tools the way they were designed to be used. DFC must be properly resourced with enough people and enough money to allow it to grow its portfolio. While development impact remains the key priority for DFC, delivering for the needs of partner countries is what also will deliver long-term influence. That is how the U.S. can compete – and all at relatively low cost to the U.S. taxpayer.

Energy & Economics
Buenos Aires, Argentina, Libertarian supporters at the inauguration of the new Argentine President Javier Milei

Remarks by the President of the Nation, Javier Milei, at the Economic Forum of the Americas (IEFA), at the Four Seasons, CABA

by Javier Milei

Good afternoon everyone, if we’re talking about exploring opportunities, clearly one would have to address growth issues. The problem is that, when one encounters a deeply unbalanced macro situation, growing becomes very difficult, almost I would say impossible. And especially when for many years, relative prices have been distorted and the economy has been put in an imbalanced situation, trying to live in a sort of permanent boom, when the boom comes it’s much more violent. That is why when the correction of relative prices is carried out, it generates a contraction of activity and employment, and the more violent and prolonged the process of overstimulating the economy, the stronger the contraction becomes. In that sense, Argentina has lived – for more than 20 years – under a wild populist regime, which has led to the destruction of capital, the destruction of productivity, which is why we are in an absolute miserable situation. Yes, because populism is not free; wages, in dollars, on average, in the 1990s, were $1,800 and if you adjusted for American inflation that would imply that Argentinian wages, on average, should be $3,000, something like 3 million pesos. And today, luckily, if we exaggerate and become very optimistic, we could say they are $600, which is false because they are lower. This means that Argentinians in this populist adventure have lost 80% of our income, that is the real catastrophe. The consequence of this is that we have more than 50% in poverty and 10% in extreme poverty, or a little more as well. This means that the country, which produces food for 400 million people and has a tax burden on the food production sector of 70%, meaning that the State takes the food from 280 million people, and has 5,000,000 Argentinians who do not have enough to eat, which is the real catastrophe. But it is not only a catastrophe in terms of growth, well-being, employment, and wages, but the inheritance was very complicated, the inheritance we received. I am going to describe the inheritance we received and the measures we have been taking during these first 100 days of government, and it’s not to mourn it, because the reality is that if there was something that became clear with “the Chief”is that we truly managed to win the elections it was because we were truly in a disastrous situation, because for a libertarian liberal, who openly says it, to come to power, it is precisely because the situation was not going to be an easy one. That means they were going to leave us in a very, very difficult situation, because otherwise the populists would continue to win. And for people to wake up the way they are doing, evidently it had to be a very complicated situation. So, I would almost say, we were always prepared to receive this hot potato, and you can see that, because if we hadn’t taken quick measures, we would have blown up several times already. Specifically, when studying, you review the literature on early crisis indicators, when you have twin deficits, by 4 points of GDP, it's a yellow alert; if you have 8 points of GDP it's not only a red alert, but you're going to take a significant hit. We inherited twin deficits of 17 points of GDP, just to give you an idea of the magnitude of the disaster we received. In other words, the size of the hit was going to be colossal; basically, the inheritance had the worst of the three worst crises in Argentina. It had a monetary imbalance worse than what we had before the "Rodrigazo" in 1975; we had an imbalance in the Central Bank's balance worse than what Alfonsín had at the beginning of 1989, which ended in hyperinflation, and worse social indicators than in 2001, that is, before the crisis of 2002. In other words, literally, it was the sum of all evils. In that sense, that twin deficit, of 7 points of GDP, was composed mainly of a 15-point consolidated fiscal deficit. Of those 15 points, 5 corresponded to the Treasury and 10 corresponded to the Central Bank. Furthermore, to give you an idea of the magnitude of the disaster we received, basically, although during the entire previous government, monetary issuance was used to finance the fiscal imbalance, by 28 points of GDP. Of those 28 points, 13 took place in the last year; not a minor issue if you think about it because the monetary base is already - today - 2.6 of GDP, meaning they left behind a quintupling of prices, and if you also look at the Central Bank's balance sheet having holdings in Leliqs, ranging from 30 to 90 days, meaning 30, 60, and 90 days, all converted into overnight loans, which means there was the possibility of multiplying the money supply by 4 in a day. In that context, moreover, during the first week of December, prices were rising by 1% daily, which means that in annual terms, it is 3700% inflation. If it stopped in the first two weeks, that would be 7500% annually, and if you look at what wholesale inflation was in December, which was 54%, that annualized is 17,000%. So, facing hyperinflation, if the economy had already entered a recessionary path in the second and third quarters last year but was fueled by a lot of monetary issuances to try to force an electoral outcome that did not happen, and in that context, it was essential to avoid hyperinflation. But to avoid hyperinflation, it was necessary to implement a very tough stabilization program, a program that we had and that we were only able to announce on the third day, basically because we had the issue of appointments at the Central Bank. And basically, it had the three fundamental elements that any stabilization program has, which were fiscal adjustment, exchange rate correction, and the definition of a new monetary policy. In that sense, for us, the key was to end monetary issuance so that there would be no monetary validation of the price increases, and that it would not escalate and generate hyperinflation. In that sense, along with the devaluation, which was made because basically all we did was bring the exchange rate to the market exchange rate, adjusted by the PAIS Tax, and in that context, on the fiscal front, we decided to adopt what is called a zero-deficit policy. But a true zero deficit, not a lie, meaning a zero deficit in the line of financial result, that is, after paying interests. This is very important because if we achieve a zero deficit in the financial line, it means that the debt no longer grows. And if the debt does not grow anymore, the debt-to-GDP ratio does not increase more, and therefore one becomes temporarily solvent, and the consequence of this is that the PAIS Tax begins to fall, and the interest rate will decrease. Thus, the interest rate regains its essential function, which is to be a mechanism of inter-temporal coordination and for the growth process to be related precisely to the interest rate, the natural interest rate, that is, the market rate, not the rate that a bureaucrat comes up with by meddling from the Central Bank. I clarify to make it clear, this idea of being tinkering... Once, I remember telling someone: "you are worse than Moreno" because Moreno controlled the prices of today, but you want to control the interest rate, which means you want to control the prices of today and the future. Why? Because the interest rate is the relative price of present goods over future goods. So, this would be much more complicated. So, we also began a process of cleaning up the Central Bank's balance sheet, and the reality is that we believed and aimed to achieve a zero deficit by 2024, and we were truly and absolutely committed to carrying out a fiscal adjustment, which obviously involves a lot of chainsaw and a lot of blender, and if we wanted to do it quickly, we had to use both. There is a lot of blender and much more, actually, of chainsaw because we eliminated public works outright, something of which I am deeply proud, considering that public works are a major source of corruption and theft, which I imagine all decent people should oppose. (APPLAUSE). On the other hand, we also completely eliminated discretionary transfers to the provinces; we also laid off 50,000 public employees, not only that but we also terminated contracts, and you see, now, more contracts are being terminated, and 70,000 contracts will be terminated. We also eliminated 200,000 social programs, irregularly delivered, and at no time did we neglect social policy because – in the midst of it all – we doubled the AUH; we doubled the Food Card; we tripled assistance in the One Thousand Days Plan, that is, for pregnant women, and not only that, but we also quadrupled assistance for school supplies and created a mechanism for middle-income families, who attend low-cost private schools, to have a support mechanism so that the children wouldn't drop out of school, which they attended, and not have to suffer the shock of changing schools, that is, we also had a strong social perspective in what we were doing, and we also did something that, at the time, when Minister Pettovello designed it, the red circle, which is increasingly analog and doesn't understand anything we do, because the digital era has already passed us by, but the interesting thing is that, at one point, Minister Pettovello announced that social programs didn't have to be verified as working, that is, social programs are given and they were required to provide work in return, and obviously, let's say, no one explained how the whole situation was, and then we, knowing how tough the first months were going to be, while the adjustment took place, because apart from when you generate an increase in savings and there is no counterpart of investments, it generates a drop in activity and that makes employment fall and/or real wages fall and that could lead to social tension, which we wanted to cushion. And in that sense, it's very interesting because Minister Pettovello removed the need for them to verify that they had worked. Obviously, the large number of monkeys, and I apologize to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals for insulting the monkeys, who look at Argentinian politics, where some obviously respond that they are very angry because they don't have a guideline, but let's say those monkeys – sorry to the monkeys, again – strongly criticized Minister Pettovello for this. What they didn't realize is that it was a way to end intermediaries, where all governments wanted to end intermediaries, but this government did it. So, basically, the people who receive social programs obviously receive a card and that goes to an account. So, they thought that with that they ensured that they would not be extorted, what they didn't know is that you must go to verify if they were working and there, when you were going to receive the verification that they had been working, the Bellibonis of life appeared, taking half of people's income. And they only validated it if you brought them the pretty ones, where they must validate that they were at the rallies. I mean, in reality, they stole half of the money and not only that, but they also had to go and work as picketers, so what you were doing was finance criminals and also ruining the functioning of the streets. In that sense, by eliminating the need for a counteroffer, until April, what happened, well, those criminals could not take away the money that people received from the social program. Therefore, without spending a penny more, this implied doubling the assistance and at the same time, we set up a phone line to report the pressures and extortions of these criminals and we have received close to 300,000 reports and today there are 18,000 cases in the courts. In other words, they are going to pay for having pressured people to go to the rallies. And furthermore, Belliboni threatened us that he was going to gather 50,000 people in the Plaza, so evidently, he planned to bring 100,000. From the Nation, we contributed with 12,000 officers, I don't remember the number that the City contributed, but it was tremendous because there were more police officers than people, as only 3,000 showed up, so it was a resounding success, coordinated at that moment between Minister Bullrich, Pettovello, and the Minister of Infrastructure. Additionally, in the public transportation, there was the announcement that fare-dodging wouldn't be penalized, and the lines for making complaints, and there we also started to organize the streets. In other words, we took away their firepower because now they can't extort people to do this, and we also started to enforce order. Therefore, one of the demands we received as a government, which was to put the streets in order, we are doing it. Because now, whoever blocks the streets doesn't get paid. And moreover, whoever does it... pays for it. And that is working perfectly. Not only that, but while we expected to achieve financial balance over the course of the year, the hard work of each minister allowed us to achieve that financial surplus in the month of January. And obviously, the "red circle" – it was logical – began to predict that we would have very strong deficits in February. And to the dismay of those who live betting against those of us who want to change, we again had a financial surplus in the month of February. Specifically, what we are doing is obtaining a result that, if you take the first two months, equivalent to half a percentage point of GDP, of primary surplus, that annualized would be 6 points. Therefore, we have over-adjusted what we needed, because we only needed to make an adjustment of 5 points of GDP. It's very funny because there are many who say that this is not sustainable, that this, that, when they said that the only thing that could be done was to adjust 1 percentage point of GDP, well, we adjusted 5 percentage points, but of course, that requires a dose of courage that others do not have. But that's not all because there's also the issue of the adjustment we made within the balance of the Central Bank, which generated a 10-point fiscal deficit, quasi-fiscal, and today that number is already 4. That is, with which there is no historical record – worldwide – of a government making an adjustment of 11 points of GDP in three months. And to the dismay of the "Helicopter Club" and all those who wish us ill, especially those whose schemes we've disrupted – which are quite evident, as you'll see them complaining. There's a saying that goes, "where there's a Kirchnerist kicking, there's a scheme that's been cut off," well, it's true. And not just Kirchnerists, but also, look at some other important economic groups. You can imagine who I'm talking about. Aside from that, they're very angry because Elon Musk has arrived. The important thing about this is that faced with the inflation disaster we had when we took office, in three weeks, inflation was at 30 percent, the retail figure, and it was expected to close the month at around 45 percent. I remember one weekend, journalist Gabriel Anello, a great journalist, and an even better person, asked me about inflation, and I told him the truth, that if it stayed at 30, it was a great number because it meant that by the fourth week, prices had stopped rising. And we found that it was 25, meaning there was a retraction in prices that had been fixed from the third week to the second. Then, in January, inflation was 20 percent, and in February, it was 13 percent. Now, when you strip out the statistical carryover effects related to one-time increases, like the tariff adjustments and prepaid health plans, that's equivalent to 6 points, so the true inflation rate for February was around 7%. In other words, we're bringing the inflation rate down to single digits. Furthermore, even if you were to include all these elements in the index, but somehow capture the effect of promotions, which can't be captured by the price index because it's a non-linear pricing scheme and depends on each citizen's consumption, then it's impossible to capture through the CPI due to the effects of "two for one," "three for two," and all those things. So, there's a sort of estimation of how much that weighs, but it can't be documented, and if that effect were considered, despite the previous factors, we would still be in single digits. Furthermore, in the third week of March, the price increase came to a halt, meaning we are moving in the right direction regarding anti-inflationary policy. In fact, some of the criticisms we receive are quite peculiar because, for example, if you look at the evolution of the inflation rate, the speed of the decline is stronger than what occurred during the convertibility period. When you examine the effects of stabilization during convertibility, prices are falling much faster today, or the inflation rate is declining much faster. This also makes sense, and what happens is that during convertibility, the money supply was endogenous, meaning that when there was an increase in the demand for money, the way to validate it was to bring in dollars and sell them to the Central Bank, which implied an expansion of the money supply and allowed for the re-adjustment of relative prices to occur with upward pressure on prices. Notice that since we took office, the monetary base has practically not changed, despite buying $11.5 billion in the market. Not only that, but we also had an expansion of the money supply due to the PUCs that the previous Central Bank administration used to try to control the exchange rate, and there was also expansion due to interest-bearing liabilities. However, the contraction due to BOPREAL has been so significant that the monetary base has barely changed or changed very little. So, we still have the same monetary base of $10 billion, but now on the asset side, we have $11.5 billion more in reserves. Therefore, we are undergoing a very strong process of balancing the Central Bank's balance sheet, and soon we will have net reserves close to zero, whereas the previous government left us with $11.5 billion in negative reserves. Not only are we achieving that, but also when the demand for money is restored, since the nominal money supply is fixed, this implies that to rebuild monetary holdings, people have to sell goods. Therefore, the deceleration of price growth is much more severe than in the convertible scheme because in the convertible scheme, the money supply expanded according to the demand for money and did not conflict with the goods market, which is what causes the inflation rate to fall much faster. I also find it very amusing to those who demand changing the pace of the exchange rate evaluation, which is ridiculous because today the free exchange rate shows no gap. If I take the reference exchange rate from the Central Bank and multiply it by 1.175, which is the PAIS Tax, it would be around 1,060. Therefore, I don't have a gap; I have a negative gap. So, if the market doesn't put it elsewhere, why would I arbitrarily modify it? Based on what? On a calculation made by clueless economists because they make that calculation of the real exchange rate, and the question is, have they never seen that during crisis periods, the real exchange rate is very high, and during boom periods, it is very low? Have they not seen the trend? Have the supply and demand conditions for all goods in the Argentinian and global economy not changed? How can they pretend to be so arrogant as to determine the price of something? Moreover, they average the average. Of what? If with the standard deviation they have, that average is ridiculous. I have an article about that, which says that the real exchange rate is when economists are part of the problem. Moreover, it implies a problem of fatal arrogance or rudeness because it would imply knowing the preferences, technology, and endowments, not only of our economy but also of the rest of the world. It seems quite pathetic to believe that they can have all that information to make all those decisions. Unfortunately, in Argentina, public education - because it's all public, it can be privately managed or state-managed - has done a lot of harm by brainwashing people and leading them to read authors who have truly been disastrous for human history and especially for Argentina. I always joke that if you go to the University of Buenos Aires, to the Faculty of Economics, and ask, "Who is Ludwig von Mises?" They will tell you he's the 9th of Holland, while for others, he's the greatest economist of all time alongside Murray Newton Rothbard. But, of course, they know the bearded one, the German impoverisher Marx, they know him. But beyond this situation, the other funny thing is that if I have the future dollar curve aligned with the Crawling Peg that the Central Bank is implementing, why would I need to devalue? It's incredible, it's ridiculous. They're looking at market data and no. The whole market is wrong, they resemble James. It's incredible because when Keynesians talk about what a great investor James was... He was involved in finance and went bankrupt like a rat and the argument... if you look at Damodaran's Valuation book, there's James’s quote saying he was so arrogant that he said, "It's no use being right when the whole market is wrong. You'll lose anyway." So, everyone was wrong except him, but when they all turned against him, he lost money and went bankrupt. He had to go ask his father, who was friends with Marshall, for help, took a 6-month course, and then got into Cambridge. And when they say he was a great investor, it was all a lie because in reality, as a person with a lot of influence in English politics, he was on both sides of the counter during the War and the Great Depression. I mean, he was in both England and the United States, and Mr. James, the fortune he made, he made through what today would put him in jail, which is the inside trading. That is, he would take information from the American government, which he would use on certain things, and trade with it. It's like the movie Wall Street, Gordon Gekko was a choirboy compared to James. So, it's also another myth that he was a great investor; the guy played with classified information. I mean, nobody else thought of it, but he did. That's why all the regulations on Wall Street came afterward. So, it seems quite comical that we have to change the crawling peg when the entire futures curve is aligned with monetary policy. And in this whole context, given the commitment we have to the deficit zero policy, I often say that I've been tied to the deficit zero policy like Ulysses to the main mast, with the advantage that I have my ministers shooting at the sirens. So, we're going, and we're doing it well. So, from receiving an economy that had a PAIS risk of 2,900 points, today it's already reaching 2,400. Analysts are seeing that we're heading towards 1,000. That's not insignificant because it opens up possibilities for us to enter the capital markets. Our credit rating has been raised, bonds that used to cost $18 are now worth $54, and Argentinian assets have appreciated significantly. When you look at the GDP data today, it's true that it fell in the first quarter, by about 4.5-points, but it's also true that analysts were expecting a 6-point drop. So, we're making a much stronger adjustment than analysts anticipated, and we're falling less. And that also encourages the idea of a "V-shaped" recovery. A very interesting piece of data from the Orlando Ferreres Consultancy emerged, which is that the seasonally adjusted figure for February was positive, just a little bit. So, we're not getting excited about that number, but at least it seems that we'll be finding the bottom at some point in the near future, and many analysts are already talking about a "V-shaped" recovery, which is understandable when you look at how quickly the PAIS risk is falling. At the same time, we are working on the issue of lifting currency controls, and as soon as we manage to clean up the Central Bank's balance sheet, when we can get rid of all the interest-bearing liabilities and put an end to this nefarious practice of remunerating liabilities, what this will imply is that the issuance of money through interest-bearing liabilities will be halted. Simultaneously, another thing we are working on is a reform of the financial system to move towards an integrated system with the capital market and build a banking system that is anti-runs. The truth is, that wouldn't be a problem today because credit to the non-financial private sector is 4-points of GDP, meaning we don't have a financial system; there is no financial system. Therefore, it's interesting that we start building a financial system that doesn't require a lender of last resort. So, if that reform includes integrating the format of banks with a format of the capital market so that we can move towards a system of free banking, that will allow us, when we have that reform, to open the financial system, lift currency controls, and in that context also pass the law against monetary issuance, where basically we consider seigniorage a crime, it's theft, it's counterfeiting, it's fraud. Issuing money is a scam. And in that sense, if there were to be monetary issuance, the President of the Central Bank, the board, the President of the Nation, the Minister of Economy, and deputies and senators who have approved budgets with fiscal deficits would go to jail. Obviously, you might say to me, "But this is Argentina," and surely another criminal will come along and change things and overturn that law. But we will give it the category of non-prescriptible, as if it were a crime against humanity. Therefore, yes, another criminal may come and change these conditions and return to the practice of issuing money, but then another may come and say, "You are a criminal, you did that," and put them in jail. So, we are going for a solution of these characteristics to end this scam of monetary issuance in Argentina. And obviously, as we can continue advancing in this system of free banking, of deep capital markets moving towards a complete system, and we have stopped issuance through rediscounts, issuance through remunerated liabilities, issuance to finance the treasury, we will have a free exchange rate, with the money supply fixed, and if it is necessary for more money to enter the system, it will be entered by the agents themselves. For example, they will open their mattress and start making transactions. Therefore, the monetization of the economy will be done by individuals themselves with the currencies they want to transact. Currency competition has a very interesting consequence. For example, if you're in the oil sector like Alejandro, you can transact with your peers in WTI, or if you're in the gas business, you can transact with others in BTU. If you're in the agriculture sector, you can transact with others using soybeans in Chicago, and so on. Each will have its own currency. This is equivalent to having a basket of currencies where the weights are determined endogenously by the people, instead of being determined by a bureaucrat at their discretion, which they will always get wrong. Even if they did it right, it would have to be this result, and that's what the agents do, so we don't need a bureaucrat sticking their finger in anywhere because they already know where the finger ends up, and often, it ends up being the arm, not the finger, where they stick it. If they had a vaseline business, they would be happier celebrating. So, once we achieve this, we'll be able to lift the currency controls. Currently, we have excess demand in the Foreign Exchange Market and excess supply in the rest of the economy, resulting in low bond prices, high interest rates, and high PAIS Tax. It also means oversupply in the goods market, leading to economic activity deterioration. In fact, our per capita GDP is 15% lower than in 2011, and we have the same number of jobs in the private sector as in 2011. This implies an increase in the number of poor and indigent people, leading to social pressure for support. Naturally, when we close this excess demand in the Foreign Exchange Market, all other excess supplies will close as well. This will result in higher bond prices, lower interest rates, closing the imbalance in the goods market, economic expansion, improvements in real wages, employment, and reduction in poverty and indigence. Then, the economy will start to rebound, despite the corrupt institutions we have and the economy's deep capitalization due to over 20 years of populism. Nonetheless, we can grow and generate genuine economic growth without inflation. And we can do all of this despite the politics, despite all the obstacles, and despite all the garbage they throw at us. But you know what? There's something wonderful, something that even the analog red circle doesn't see. Every DNU issued in Argentina, all of them were aimed at generating regulations, in other words, reducing market freedom, making markets more concentrated, giving businesses to cronies, huge scams, and above all, encroaching on individual freedoms. Remember what they did during the pandemic, this gang of criminals, and yet there were people applauding them for locking us up. No one opposed that deluge of DNUs. Our DNU is the first in history to restore individual freedoms, making markets more competitive. Look at the wonderful thing in the issue of rentals; you couldn't find a property. The number of rental properties doubled, prices in real terms dropped, and the real estate market expanded strongly during the month of February. Look at the interesting things the DNU achieved, which is still in effect, but had a setback in the Senate, which, by the way, isn't so bad because if we only have seven senators and we got 25 votes, it wasn't so bad, there's improvement, there are people betting on change. But obviously, since this also touches on political scams, evidently, since politicians don't want to give up their scams, don't want to lose their privileges, don't want to give up anything, they'd rather sink Argentinians into misery to maintain their caste privileges, that's why they overturned the DNU. And this is very interesting because if I had told you that in two or three months, we were going to be able to order the Argentine ideological spectrum, you would have said I was crazy. And after what happened with the Basic Law and what happened with the DNU, it's wonderful in terms of the principle of revelation; they left all their fingers dirty. On one side, there are the orcs, who are orcs and can't be expected to behave differently because they are orcs. Then there are the people who truly want change, and there are the fraudulent criminals who say they want change, but in reality, they disguise themselves as wanting change but are just as criminal as the orcs, but they are ashamed to be associated with them. So, they hide behind formalities and all those issues, but deep down, they are the same garbage as the orcs. It was very interesting because it became evident, both in the voting in the House, particularly on the articles, and in the Senate the other day, they were exposed. Today, with the vote, it became clear who is against progress, who the criminals are, who are in favor of scams and theft, and who are against returning freedom to the people, against competitive markets, and against letting go of the scams so that people can get their money back. So, it's wonderful because in three months, we ended up unmasking these criminals. And that's also very interesting because it won't come for free in the midterm election; they will pay with their votes, and those criminals will be left out. That will allow us to have a much better midterm election than the one we had last year. That's interesting because we'll have another composition of Congress, and all the reforms that we couldn't push through now, we'll do it at that time, starting on December 11th, 2025. Furthermore, we'll push through the 3,000 pending reforms that we couldn't pass because of this group of criminals who are the obstruction machine, who want the status quo to continue, where you pay the bill, and they benefit. Therefore, I am very optimistic about the future because we are achieving a lot of things despite politics, and people are seeing that. It's very interesting because even though we are facing the largest adjustment in the history of humanity, with 70% of Argentinians acknowledging that they are worse off... There are some very important data points. The first one is that when we took office, only 20% of Argentinians believed they would be better off in a year's time, but in January, that number rose to 30%, in February it climbed to 42%, and today it stands at 50%. This means that despite being worse off in the present, 50% of Argentinians are convinced that we will be better off from now on. Not only that, but 70% of Argentinians are convinced that we will defeat inflation, with 50% of them believing we will do it in the first year and 20% believing we will do it in the second year. When you look at what's happening in terms of a word that represents the sentiment of Argentinians, the word that appears most strongly and fundamentally dominates is "Hope". Yes, people have "Hope", people see that we are going to make it. There is light at the end of the tunnel, and people are seeing it, even though they are going through a tough time now. They've realized that populism leads nowhere, they've realized that the solution lies in embracing the ideas of Liberty, and that's no small feat. If today were the elections in a runoff, we would be getting 58%, that is, it would be 58, 42. Instead of +2, we are +16, and when you ask that group: Who would you vote for in the first round? They would vote for ‘Libertad Avanza’ with 48%, that is, we improved the voting strength by 60% compared to what we obtained. This means that with that alone, we would already win in the first round because the second person in voting intention is Mrs. Cristina Fernández Kirchner with 20%. But not only that, there are 10 points, which if we go for the most rudimentary case, half and half, 48 and 5 = 53. Therefore, what I want to tell you is that there is hope. Do you know why there is hope? Because people woke up, they decided to stop being sheep and decided to be Lions now. Therefore, there is hope because Argentinians are embracing the ideas of freedom, not only that I'm going to tell them that we're going to be better, but they also already know that we're going to be better. Therefore, Argentina does have a future because that future is liberal. Thank you very much.

Energy & Economics
Argentine President Javier Milei takes the stage to speak during the 2024 CPAC Conference at the Gaylord National Resort Convention Center in Washington DC on February 24, 2024

Javier Milei ended a DC - sized deficit in... nine weeks

by Peter St. Onge

Argentina’s Javier Milei is racking up some solid wins, with the fiscal basket case seeing its first monthly budget surplus in 12 years. Apparently, it took Milei just nine and a half weeks to balance a budget that was projected at 5% of GDP under the previous government. In US terms, he turned a 1.2 trillion-dollar annual deficit into a 400 billion surplus. In 9 and a half weeks. How did he do it? Easy: he cut a host of central government agency budgets by 50% while slashing crony contracts and activist handouts. For perspective, if you cut the entirety of Washington's budget by 50%, you'd save a fast 3 trillion dollars and start paying off the national debt. It turns out it can be done, and the world doesn't collapse into chaos.    Milei Making Fast Progress Deficits aren’t the only win Milei's logged. He’s slashed crony regulation, got rid of currency controls, and recently slashed rent prices by removing controls — that actually led to a doubling of apartments for rent in Buenos Aires, slashing rent costs. Unfortunately, it's not all smooth sailing: a bill to privatize corrupt state-owned companies — to effectively de-Soviet the Argentine economy — was blocked by the socialist opposition who serve the government unions who would lose their jobs. Meanwhile, a major Milei reform to make it a lot easier to hire people but would hurt unions was struck down by the high court, which said it must go through Congress. Having said that, for the average Argentinian, these are deckchairs on the Titanic compared to the elephant in the economy: Argentina's hyperinflation. Just last week, the monthly inflation figure came in at 20.6% — on the month. That was a lot better than the outgoing government, but it still left year-on-year inflation at 254%. Why so high? Partly because Milei had to free up the exchange rate to smooth the path to dollarization — for Argentina adopting the US dollar instead of the local confetti. But mostly because the rivers of money printed by the previous socialists continue to run through the battered ruins they left of Argentina's economy. After all, Milei's only been in office for two months.  Argentina’s Dollarization Milei's reforms will continue to be trench warfare. But his inflation progress is going to be key to retaining support. He just notched a big win with the deficit, but it only stops the bleeding — the patient is still on life support. To fully kill Argentina's hyperinflation, Milei would need to make real progress on the dollarization — or, dare we dream, a gold standard. On dollarization, that would involve announcing a months-long window for peso assets to be revalued in dollars. He's been preparing the groundwork so far — the currency controls and deficits are a big help. And he's surely motivated to do it since dollarization in other countries like did it like Ecuador has 90% public support. But it is a complicated process, and if done badly, he'll be dead in the water. The stakes are high. And not just for Argentina: If Milei succeeds, he'll be a model for radically shrinking government in other countries in Latin America, in the rest of the world, and even for our spineless goblins in Washington. Originally published at profstonge.com.

Energy & Economics
Border between USA and Mexico

How the US Regime Subsidizes Immigration—both Legal and Illegal

by Ryan McMaken

In recent months, stories from both the legacy media and the independent media have continued to pile up on how undocumented foreign nationals—also known as "migrants" and "illegal aliens"—are able to take advantage of a vast network of taxpayer funded benefits in daycare, medical care, housing, and more. For example, both the New York Post and Denver Post report that these foreign nationals have "overwhelmed" the Denver Health hospital system in Denver, and that the situation is "unsustainable." Meanwhile, public schools report classrooms are filling up quickly with the children of these foreign nationals. Denver is hardly alone. The New York Post notes that both the City of New York and the state government have expanded local welfare programs, including pre-paid credit cards, to further ensure that migrants continue to receive cash and resources from American taxpayers. This is in addition to the approximately 66,000 foreign nationals who are housed in hotels and shelters, care of both New York and federal taxpayers. USAToday reports that colleges "across the country" are receiving millions in taxpayer money to offer housing to migrants at no charge. Chicago's mayor is bragging he's giving away $17 million in taxpayer-funded giveaways to "asylum seekers" who are presently living off the sweat of the taxpayers in government shelters. This, of course, is just a downpayment on many more planned giveaways. Just how much in taxpayers' resources is going to foreign nationals? It's difficult to estimate for a number of reasons. The spending is done through numerous different government agencies at various levels of government. Moreover, much of the money if filtered through non-profits (i.e., "NGOs") that are labeled "charities" but are simply adjuncts of the regime. Once we add up $1 billion here and $77 million there, after a while we're talking about real money, and one thing becomes abundantly clear: the regime and its partners are subsidizing the influx of foreign nationals who are promised a variety of both cash and in-kind benefits. It must also be noted that, contrary to certain myths, the largesse is not reserved for only the so-called "illegal aliens." Legal immigrants can take advantage of the generous and well-funded American welfare state even more readily than can the undocumented migrants. What is the effect of subsidizing a particular product or activity? It is usually the same everywhere we look: you get more of what you subsidize. This is true of student loans, it's true of ethanol, and it's true of migrants. Economic theory tells us that the government cannot possibly know the "correct" number of migrants, nor should the regime be free to centrally plan some arbitrary number. On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that the number of migrants—even with lax border enforcement—would be as high as it is without the regime's incessant subsidization of migrants, both legal and illegal. How Many Foreign Nationals Live in the United States? According to the Congressional Research Service, it is estimated there were approximately 45-46 million foreign-born residents of the United States in 2022. Of those, about 53 percent, or 24 million, are naturalized citizens. In addition to this there are 12.9 million legal permanent residents (LPRs) and approximately 11 million more are so-called "illegal" immigrants. All combined, we find that 23 million non-citizen US residents—i.e., "foreign nationals"—are living in the United States. That's about 51 percent of the overall foreign-born population. As we will see, many of them receive financial support and resources from US taxpayers. (This measure does not count the approximately 3.2 million nonimmigrant workers, students, exchange visitors, diplomats, and their relatives who have sought only temporary residence in the United States. These nonimmigrant groups are not eligible for public benefits.) Are Foreign Nationals Eligible for Welfare? Among immigrant foreign nationals, most are eligible for some form of taxpayer-funded "public" benefits. For example, undocumented foreign nationals may legally access "treatment under Medicaid for emergency medical conditions," a variety of in-kind services such a soup kitchens and temporary housing, and "programs for housing or community development assistance or financial assistance administered by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development..." That's just the direct federally-funded services. State and local government may elect to provide additional services at local taxpayers' expense. The welfare programs available to legal foreign nationals are far more broad. Legal foreign nationals (LPRs) can access most federal welfare programs after an initial five-year period. This includes non-emergency Medicaid, CHIP, TANF (i.e., cash assistance), food stamps, and SSI. Access to these programs have been further broadened by state governments. As noted by the National Immigration Law Center: Over half of the states have used state funds to provide TANF, Medicaid, and/or CHIP to immigrants who are subject to the five-year bar on federally funded services, or to a broader group of immigrants. A growing number of states and counties provide health coverage to children, young adults, or pregnant persons regardless of their immigration status. Several states offer or will offer health coverage to older adults regardless of their immigration status. And five states (California, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington) and the District of Columbia offer or will offer public or private health coverage with state subsidies to all otherwise eligible immigrants regardless of their immigration status. It is not necessary to be employed to maintain legal permanent resident status, even if one is of working age. After all, LPRs are not the same at temporary nonimmigrant workers like H1B visa holders: "Green card holders [LPRs] can also collect unemployment compensation the same way citizens do ...nor can a legal permanent resident be deported for being unemployed." Legal immigrants do not jeopardize their legal status by applying for additional taxpayer funded benefits such as food stamps: "SNAP enrollment will NOT affect your ability to remain in the United States, get a green card/permanent resident status, keep your green card/permanent resident status, or become a U.S. citizen." In short, nearly the full gamut of taxpayer-funded welfare programs are open to legal foreign nationals after the initial five-year bar. Moreover, many migrants aren't even held to that, including "[r]efugees, people granted asylum or withholding of deportation/removal, Cuban/Haitian entrants, certain Amerasian immigrants" and other specific groups are exempted from the waiting period. All these foreign nationals, regardless of status, are free to send their children to government childcare centers known as "public schools." How Much Do Foreign Nationals Use American Social Benefits? A variety of organizations have attempted to quantify the extent to which both naturalized immigrants and current foreign nationals use welfare programs. This study from the National Academies concludes that the data show[s] that the immigrant households use several programs, most notably food assistance and Medicaid, at higher rates than do households led by the native-born. ...This higher use of welfare programs by immigrants is attributable to their lower average incomes and larger families. In the NA study, immigrant households with children utilized welfare programs at higher rates in nearly every US state. In California, 61.5 percent of households utilized welfare while 40.7 percent of immigrant households did. In Texas, the same measures are at 66.3 and 44.2 percent, respectively. Similar proportions are found in Florida and New York. This report unfortunately does not differentiate between naturalized immigrants and foreign nationals. However, given that naturalized immigrants tend to earn 50 to 70 percent more than non-citizen immigrants, it is safe to conclude that foreign nationals utilize welfare programs more than naturalized immigrants, and therefore more than the native population. An increasingly important addition to legal immigration in recent decades has been the population of immigrants legally designated as refugees. In total, this all costs the taxpayers nearly two billion dollars per year, or $80,000 per refugee per year in the form of federal and state programs including food stamps, child care, and public housing. The Center for Immigration Studies has published studies similar to the NA study. These CIS studies show similar results. In 2012, 51 percent of households headed by an immigrant (legal or illegal) reported that they used at least one welfare program during the year, compared to 30 percent of native households. Welfare in this study includes Medicaid and cash, food, and housing programs. Immigrant households have much higher use of food programs (40 percent vs. 22 percent for natives) and Medicaid (42 percent vs. 23 percent). Note that these conclusions reflect immigrant households rather than immigrant individuals. This is an important distinction because many immigrant households contain citizen children who became citizens at birth due to being born in the United States. Thus, the household may contain both citizens and foreign nationals—some of whom may be illegal foreign nationals. These households, however, enjoy access to welfare programs by virtue of the underage members' citizenship. Thus, immigrant households can access taxpayer funded healthcare, food stamps, housing programs (and more) through the native-born children. Similar trends persist when non-citizen households are measured separately from all immigrant households combined. Some researchers insist that welfare benefits for foreign nationals ought to be measured only on an individual, per capita basis. For example, in this report from the CATO institute, the researchers conclude that for 2020, native-born residents, on average, cost welfare programs $8,335 per capita while immigrants cost welfare programs $6,063. These proportions can vary by program. For example, the per capita Medicaid cost for immigrants is $1,859, while the cost for native-born residents is $2,081. The use of food stamps is similar ($190 per capita for immigrants versus $214 per capita for natives), Immigrants usage of SSI is slightly higher ($188 per capita) than it is for natives ($169 per capita). How much taxpayer funding are we talking about overall? The CATO report estimates that the total cost of welfare going to non-native US residents in 2020 was $290.4 billion, That's a sum equal to the combined budgets of the Departments of Education and Homeland Security. Yet, only about half of non-natives are non-citizen foreign nationals. To find the sum used by non-citizen immigrants, we can't just divide the sum in half because foreign nationals tend to use welfare more than naturalized immigrants. So, given the $290.4 billion total for immigrant welfare spending, we can estimate that at least $150 billion of that is consumed by foreign nationals—a sum about equal to the combined budgets of the Departments of Education, State, and Housing and Urban Development. (This spending total excludes state and local spending on government schools for the children of foreign nationals.) An older CATO study (from 2013) does break out non-citizens from immigrants overall. Here, the researchers conclude that low-income immigrants use food stamps more than naturalized immigrants, and only slightly less than native-born residents. When it comes to taxpayer funded healthcare: one in five non-citizen immigrants collect this benefit while slightly more than 1 in 4 natives collects this particular form of taxpayer largesse. The Migration Policy Center reports that in 2021, 32 percent of immigrants (both citizen and non-citizen) used government health insurance. That's comparable to 38 percent of natives. Yet, even by this conservative measure of immigrant welfare usage, the best we can say is that immigrants use welfare at a rate slightly lower than that of natives. One could argue that, at the low end, immigrants receive (per capita) about 70 to 75 cents for every welfare dollar that goes to natives. That's not exactly "good news" given that overall federal spending on social benefits amounts to about half of the annual $6.3 trillion budget and is clearly out of control. The fact that natives get most of this is hardly an exoneration of immigrants. It's more of an indictment of native-born Americans, millions of whom exploit their most productive fellow citizens every month to keep the government benefits flowing. In any case, we find tax money flows freely to foreign nationals, and immigration to the United States is heavily subsidized. We should not be surprised when a lot of immigrants show up to get their share.

Energy & Economics
Picture of Javier Milei

Javier Milei Understands the Road to Serfdom

by Augusto Bottari

Each week we encounter mouthwatering policies implemented by the newly elected libertarian president of Argentina Javier Milei. He has the libertarian community in awe. His arrival to politics with an openly antisystem discourse shook not only the local scene in Argentina but also the rest of the world. But how? The respective libertarian parties in each country barely get enough votes to even appear on the main grid on election night! There are numerous reasons as to why this may be. We libertarians know ourselves well and no one with a minimum of self-criticism is surprised that our current situation in party politics is such. While political culture differs by country, our internal ideological discussions as libertarians are the same. While there’s no formula for liberty, one may find Milei’s Rothbardian pattern interesting. In a world sunk in destructionist trends, many voices of reason emerge. Are any of them following these same steps? Let’s now look at some factors that led Javier Milei to the presidency. Understanding of the Market Economics has been the main problem in Argentina for almost its entire history. Crisis after crisis has kept the country stagnant, and the application of different recipes, even with new parties in power, didn’t seem to produce any results. That is why the public interest has gradually turned to economists for answers. Javier Milei understood that need. He published successful books, articles, and even had his own comedic theatrical play on economic affairs. His repeated appearances on television since 2015 were because he knew how to have channels make money. Whenever he popped up at a talk show, there was a peak in ratings. Everybody wanted him! Despite his eccentric appearance, yelling, and proliferated insults, he exuded a magnetism that filled the viewer with curiosity. Although other valuable libertarian economists were gaining prominence, no one equaled him. Without understanding everything he said, the public still perceived he wasn’t talking nonsense—his speech and arguments were logical and made sense. For instance, on his explanation on the illegitimacy of taxes, he immortalized the phrase, “Are you in favor of stealing?” And he proceeded to explain how taxes were forcibly extracted, just like in a robbery. He’d even conclude by referring to Lysander Spooner’s analogy: “At least the robber has more honor than the politician; he shows his face and risks his life!” Education As Murray Rothbard says in the last chapter of For a New Liberty, A prime and necessary condition for libertarian victory . . . is education: the persuasion and conversion of large numbers of people to the cause. Libertarians must, therefore, engage in hard thinking and scholarship, put forth theoretical and systematic books, articles, and journals, and engage in conferences and seminars. On the other hand, a mere elaboration of the theory will get nowhere if no one has ever heard of the books and articles; hence the need for publicity, slogans, student activism, lectures, radio, and TV spots, etc. Milei’s simplicity in explaining the libertarian philosophy and economic principles from an Austrian perspective made people learn. Watching the night talk show with Milei’s presence wasn’t just another moment of mind-numbing TV garbage: it became an eye-opening experience. Moreover, he used to always carry a book with him. Whether it was one of his own or Economics in One Lesson or The Fatal Conceit. At times he’s been seen with Chaos Theory or Defending the Undefendable. In each of his appearances one could write down several authors or book titles, which he’d also often share in social media. The mention of names such as Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, or Friedrich Hayek on prime time was not in vain. Genuine Followers Young people composed his main harvest of followers. Accustomed to growing up seeing the same people in power, and a not-so-different opposition, they found in Milei’s speech a flame of hope which illuminated a possible future with features similar to wealthy countries. Followers began to mention Milei in conversations with their peers, behaving like someone newly converted to a religion and wanting everyone to know. Countless users began to create content on libertarianism, from quotes, infographics, and videos spreading the ideas, which soon became very popular. That is how the demonization of the ideas of liberty and capitalism was lifted. Social Media These mentioned followers became key, especially during the elections. Their exceptional communication and research skills served to unmask, expose, and humiliate politicians and supporters 24/7. The tireless work was impressive. It took the form of memes, slogans, or trending topics. X’s importance as a free-speech platform was extraordinary, unlike during Milei’s 2021 campaign for Congress where his main supporters were banned on Twitter and came back each time with a new account. The political class had fallen behind. It had no chance in the virtual world, which had been taken over years ago by libertarians while they neglected the people. Despite Milei’s opposition using public funds to plaster the streets with their faces and paying for highly invasive and disturbing ads against him on social media, his organic and decentralized activists communicated his message unceasingly, resisted endless attacks, and discredited operations. Paradigm Shift The then-current government, whose banners were “the people” and the working class, in practice dedicated itself to multiplying poverty. They themselves lived like kings in total dissonance with the needs of the common people. Their main followers are composed of themselves and people who benefit from the state’s parasitism machinery: union leaders, government employees, corporate media, “artists” and “intellectuals.” The working people, increasingly distanced from those who claim to represent them, resonated with Milei’s ideas. Why? Because they carry civilization and progress upon their shoulders. The political class was losing credibility, and with it the elections, for not seeing this change replicating all over the world. Today the political class at a global level is using different motives to drive the structure of systematic stealing. Race, immigration, climate change, digital currency—you name it. These ideas have been implanted by the elites through prominent figures and the media, financed by public funds. The more radical their attempts, the more they demonstrate their desperation. We have the opportunity for what seems to be a new beginning in the world with a subtle comeback of the ideas upon which civilization rests. If Mises called the twentieth century the century of socialism, may we be able to call the twenty-first century the century of libertarianism.

Energy & Economics
Page of the book highlighting the words

Disquiet in the world’s middle class

by Homi Kharas

“Originally published by Homi Kharas at Brookings Future Development on 21 November 2023,” “Middle-class life satisfaction rests on two pillars. The first is the idea that hard work and self-initiative will lead to prosperity. The second is that thanks to this prosperity, the children of middle-class families will enjoy even more opportunities for the good life. Both pillars are shaking.” Joining the middle class has been a ticket to the good life for two centuries now, a history I trace in a new book “The Rise of the Global Middle Class.” The American Dream, the glorious years of European reconstruction after World War II, miracle economic growth in Japan and other East Asian countries, Xi Jinping’s great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and India’s software revolution each brought hundreds of millions of people into the ranks of the global middle class. Today, thanks to this progress, most of the world, upwards of 4 billion people, enjoy a middle-class or better lifestyle for the first time ever. Yet, across the world there is a clear sense of disquiet in the middle class. In the U.S., Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton have documented the prevalence of “deaths of despair” due to suicides, opioids, and alcohol poisoning among non-college educated white middle-class males. The Japanese have coined a specific word, karoshi, to describe deaths due to overwork among salaried professionals. China is seeing a campaign of tang ping, or lying flat, to protest the “996” expectations of employers—9 a.m. to 9 p.m. 6 days a week. India ranks 126th out of 137 in the rankings of the 2023 World Happiness Report. What is amiss? Middle-class life satisfaction rests on two pillars. The first is the idea that hard work and self-initiative will lead to prosperity. The second is that thanks to this prosperity, the children of middle-class families will enjoy even more opportunities for the good life. Both pillars are shaking. The first is threatened by the effects of technological change on jobs. The foundations of the second are being undermined by climate change, pollution, and the destruction of nature. For most of history, technology has changed the nature of work by reducing repetitive, routine, and manual labor. During COVID-19 and the ensuing recovery, many workers changed occupations. Those with good jobs, requiring cognitive, non-routine tasks, did better than those engaged in manual, repetitive tasks. There are pathways to high-wage work, but, as my Brookings colleagues Maria Escobari and co-authors have shown, access to these paths is unequal, and that is creating stress and mental health problems for many middle-class workers. Stepping-stone occupations that serve as a bridge between low-and higher-wage occupations, and even high-wage occupations themselves, are increasingly under threat from artificial intelligence. When the Writers Guild of America went on strike in May 2023, they demanded that ChatGPT be used only as a research tool, not for actual script writing, the creative process that is at the heart of their jobs. The wobbly second pillar of middle-class satisfaction is that young people are worrying that the mass consumption of the middle-class is responsible for unsustainable levels of greenhouse gas emissions, pollution and species extinction. On current trajectories, children born today will live in a world that is at least 3 degrees warmer than pre-industrial levels. The impact of such changes, according to the best available science, is terrifying. “Is a middle-class lifestyle consistent with a livable planet? Thankfully, the answer is yes, but only if there is significant change in economic policies.” This science forces the middle class to confront an existential question. Is a middle-class lifestyle consistent with a livable planet? Thankfully, the answer is yes, but only if there is significant change in economic policies. Consider the case of Switzerland, one of the richest economies in the world. The Swiss emit only 5 tonnes of greenhouse gases per person per year, less than one-third the U.S. level. One reason is that Switzerland buys a lot of electricity from France’s nuclear reactors. But on other measures, too, such as building efficiency, moving people on electric trains and buses, and insulating homes, the Swiss middle class outperform many of their peers. True, this is not enough. The 5 tonnes must be reduced to zero by 2050, but Switzerland’s case shows that most of the current levels of carbon emissions are not tied to middle-class standards of living but simply to bad or thoughtless policies in rich countries that can be readily corrected. In similar vein, pollution is a man-made problem, not a necessary corollary of high living standards. In its current form, recycling is not effective. A new concept of a circular economy offers much more promise. The idea is to “design out” waste and pollution, recycle materials and regenerate nature. One of the first problems the circular economy concept is tackling is the issue of plastic packaging. Because of its ubiquity, plastic continues to accumulate in our oceans (and increasingly in our bodies). There are, however, alternative materials that can be used for packaging, and already the European Union is on track to make all packaging recyclable by 2030. A third area of concern is human encroachment into nature. The current global system of food production is based on expanding croplands to grow feed or as pasture for animals, especially cattle and sheep. This system has a double cost. It contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, and it destroys wildlands and biodiversity. The simplest option would be to encourage the middle class to switch to a vegetarian diet. If this magically happened in the world, a land area stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego could be returned to nature. In a less extreme version, if beef and lamb were taken out of our diets, an area the size of North America could be re-wilded. These examples are not offered as realistic policy options in the medium term. They do, however, serve to make a point. If the middle-class is serious about preserving nature, it will require a major change in diet. That could come about through taxes on land-intensive foods or through technology—lab-grown meat is available but only at a higher price point, and it has yet to scale. The common theme in these threats to a middle-class lifestyle is that the values of hard work and personal responsibility that are the hallmark of middle-class success are no longer enough. Policymakers are caught in trying to deliver higher living standards to their citizens and more sustainable living standards for their children. There are long-run strategies where economic growth and sustainability go hand-in-hand, but no countries have yet shown how to manage the transition onto these low-carbon pathways in a rapid, credible way. So the future is uncertain, and the middle-class, which hates uncertainty, will remain disquieted until they are clear about how to best secure the lifestyles and progress to which they have become accustomed.

Energy & Economics
President of Ireland Michael D. Higgins giving speech at World Food Form

Keynote address the Closing Ceremony of the World Food Forum

by Michael D. Higgins

Director-General, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Dear Friends, Young and Old, This week, as we have gathered here at the World Food Forum in the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations in Rome to discuss the necessary transformation of our agri-food systems, we must not only be conscious of targets missed or imperfectly achieved, but of the need for courage, and to generate new capacity to move to new models of better connection between economy, social protection, social justice and ecology. We are confronted with a climate and biodiversity emergency that cannot be handled by the tools that produced it or by the architecture of how we made decisions before. We are called upon to, once and for all, tackle with alternatives and sustained effort and innovation, the vicious circle of global poverty and inequality, global hunger, debt and climate change, our interacting crises. That is the context in which sustainable food systems must be achieved. I ask you all gathered today to respond in the most meaningful way within your capacity, within your generation, in a way that includes all generations, to the challenge set out by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in his recent statements: This is how the Secretary-General put it: “The Sustainable Development Goals aren’t just a list of goals. They carry the hopes, dreams, rights and expectations of people everywhere. In our world of plenty, hunger is a shocking stain on humanity and an epic human rights violation. It is an indictment of every one of us that millions of people are starving in this day and age.” It can be put right but we must change and there is work involved in upskilling in such a way that we can not only identify and critique assumptions of failing models but be able to put the alternative models in place. We have had so many broken promises. Only 15 percent of some 140 specific targets to achieve the 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals are on track to be achieved. Many targets are going in the wrong direction at the present rate, and not a single one is expected to be achieved in the next seven years. However, we have some reasons to be hopeful. When I look around this room today, I see so many engaged and committed people, including young people who have the enthusiasm, energy and creativity needed to tackle the serious structural causes of food insecurity and global hunger. But it is important to acknowledge that young people are not alone in seeking authenticity of words delivered into actions that have an ethical outcome. There are those who have spent their lives seeking a fairer world, one in which hunger would be eliminated – as it can be. We must recognise their efforts. We must work together to harness this collective energy and creativity into strong movements that will deliver, finally, a food-secure world for all. This will require, I suggest, moving to a new culture of sharing information, experiences, insights. As the cuts have taken effect, we must take the opportunity of developing a view, post-silo culture, of sharing insights, and I see FAO as uniquely positioned for this. As Glenn Denning, Peter Timmer and other food experts have stated, achieving food security is not an easy task given how food hunger is “deeply entwined with the organisation of economic activities and their regulation through public policies”, given, too, how governments and markets must work together, how the private, public and third sectors must work together. All of our efforts must have the character of inclusivity. Each of us as global citizens has a responsibility to respond. To ignore it would be a dereliction of our duty of care to our shared planet and its life-forms including our fellow humans and future generations. The Secretary-General’s pleas in relation to the consequences of climate change are given a further terrible reality in the increased and spreading threat of hunger, a food insecurity which is directly affected by the impact of climate change. For example, figures published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations show that 26.2 percent of Africa’s population experienced severe food insecurity in 2021, with 9.8 percent of the total global population suffering from undernourishment the same year. It is time for us all, as leaders and global citizens, to take stock of how words are leading to actions, to increase the urgency of our response to what is a grave existential threat and to achieve change. It is clear, as the Secretary-General’s powerful statement shows, that we need to begin the work of reform in our international institutional architecture, such as UN reform at the highest level, including the Security Council and the Bretton Woods institutions, if we are to achieve what the Secretary-General has suggested is the challenge to “turn a year of burning heat into a year of burning ambition”. Let us commit then to sharing purposes, projects, resources, seeking a new culture for sustenance solutions. Those of us who have spent much of our lives advocating UN reform believe that its best prospects are in the growing acknowledgement of the importance of the vulnerabilities and frustrated capacity of the largest and growing populations of the world being represented, not only nominally but effectively, through a reform that includes reform of the Bretton-Woods Institutions. As Secretary-General Guterres has said on a number of occasions, it is time to reform what are 1945 institutions, including the Security Council and Bretton Woods, in order to align with the “realities of today’s world”. We have to acknowledge too that the development models of the 1950s and 1960s were part of the assumptions that brought us to the crises through which we are living. New models are needed and the good news is that a new epistemology, our way of looking at the world, of sufficiency and sustainability, is emerging. We are seeing good work already occurring. Good development scholarship is available to us. I reference, for example Pádraig Carmody’s recent book, Development Theory and Practice in a Changing World. Such work builds important bridges from the intellectual work that is so badly needed and is welcome at the centre of our discourse on all aspects of interacting crises, including global hunger, and the need to link economy, ecology and a global ethics. What we must launch now is a globalisation from below. Replacing the globalisation from above that has given us a burning planet and threatened democracy itself, with a globalisation from below of the fullest participation, we can establish and indeed extend democracy, offering accountability and transparency of our work together. Writers such as Pádraig Carmody are not alone in suggesting that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals provides the opportunity for moving past the worst contradictions of failed models and dangerous undeclared assumptions. The demise of hegemonic development theory and practice may be a result of several factors, such as the rise of ultra-nationalism around the world, the increasing importance of securitisation where the most powerful insulate their lives from the actions of the excluded, and the existential threat posed by the climate crisis. Such research adds to the growing body of development literature that argues for a pro-active, structural-focused, tailored approach to development. The Hand-in-Hand Initiative of the FAO, details of which were discussed at this week’s parallel session, is a most welcome initiative, one that aims to raise incomes, improve the nutritional status and well-being of poor and vulnerable populations, and strengthen resilience to climate change. It heralds a belated recognition too of the insufficiency of a reactive emergency response to famine and hunger crises. It suggests a move towards one that tackles the underlying structural causes of hunger. Young people will need patience and to dig sufficiently deep to achieve these necessary changes. They are right in seeking to be partners, so much more than being allowed as attendees. Hand-in-Hand recognises the importance of tailor-made interventions to food security, using the best available evidence in the form of spatial data, validated on the ground through local diagnostics and policy processes, to target the most food insecure, the most hungry, the poorest. It recognises that context-specific employment and labour market policies are part of the sustainability challenge. I believe that evidence from below is crucial to achieving globalisation from below and that it can be achieved by a reintroduction of new re-casted anthropology guided by, among others, the new African scholars now available, whose work is empirical and peer-tested, can be invaluable in giving transparency on projects and investments – a strategy for fact-gathering for empowerment of rural people so like the 1955 fact-gathering with rural people of the FAO – first published in 1955 and used by me in 1969! Young people must be about upskilling to be able to critique all of the assumptions guiding the policies on to their lives. A key objective for us now must be to strengthen institutional capacity on the ground, not only at the strategic level, but also fundamentally, so that the public, farmers, and other stakeholders’ institutions are enabled to participate in territories-based agri-food systems. Such a move is fundamental to a successful food security strategy. Our institutional architecture and the multilateral bodies within it, must be made fit for purpose if we are to tackle effectively and meaningfully our contemporary food insecurity crisis which is worsening according to the 2023 Global Report on Food Crises, with 258 million people across 58 countries suffering acute food insecurity. Perhaps most crucially, we must acknowledge, as United Nations Programmes such as the Hand-in-Hand Initiative does, the critical importance of partnership and collaboration in addressing global hunger. We must do everything we can to ensure cross-sectoral co-ordination, foster coherent development actions, under a common, shared vision. We must end all wasteful competitive silo behaviours, create a culture of openness and co-operation. The FAO is well positioned to lead on this with its new invigorated partnerships with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Co-operation in the development and implementation of new models will be key to the achieving of any targets that seek to be sustainable and inclusive. For example, I suggest it will achieve best results if funders, such as the African Development Bank, are enabled and funded to work closely with research institutes, both at the national and international level, but particularly take account of field studies conducted over time at local level in the new anthropology so as to ensure that findings from the latest research feed into the design and implementation of any financial supports and investments. By providing a platform, a shared interactive transparent space for national authorities and producers, national and global businesses, multilateral development banks and donors to discuss and advance ways and means to finance the supported national food programmes, initiatives such as Hand-in-Hand are proving to be an effective flagship programme of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Co-operation must work both ways. For example, the parts of the so-called ‘developed’ world suffering from problems of high levels of obesity and food wastage must learn from the deep knowledge and wisdom existing in the most populated continents, as well as the science, which points to a new ecological revolution, one in which agroecology – the bringing of ecological principles to develop new management approaches in agroecosystems – can play a fundamental role, especially for the poorest of our global citizens. We have seen the destructive impact of colonial models of agronomy promoting an over-reliance on a small number of commodity crops, herders incentivised to become less mobile and store less grain in order to maximise commodity crop production, and increasing imports in conditions of near monopoly of seeds, pesticides and fertilisers. This had the deadly effect of opening up farmers not only to the full force of extended droughts, the ravages of variable climate conditions, and a reliance on non-indigenous inputs, but also to global spaces where they have insufficient influence. We must retreat from these dysfunctional food systems model, with their related dependencies, with urgency and embrace models of sufficiency and effective local markets and see the value of making our way too that includes agro-ecological models that promote food security and development opportunities for the poorest people on our fragile planet. Adaptation and responding to the already changing climate is crucial for all of us, and especially in the most food-insecure nations. We must restore degraded ecosystems, introduce drought-resistant crops, ensure accessible digital services for smallholder farms, while creating new, sustainable green jobs for young people so that we may forge a smart, sustainable, climate-resilient development path for the continent. This week we have to acknowledge the many challenges we face including, inter alia, the energy, climate and biodiversity crises, war and conflict which exacerbate food insecurity, ensuring enabling policy environments, and reaching the long-term goal of sustainable food system transformation. Any agri-food initiative, be it for Africa, the Middle-East, Central or South America, or other food-insecure regions, must place inclusivity at its core. Specifically, more vulnerable, smallholder farmers must be targeted for inclusion as programme beneficiaries, not just large-scale, industrial level farmers and ever-expanding commercial plantations. Research has shown that irresponsible agri-business deals are sometimes falsely legitimated by the promotion of alleged achievement of Sustainable Development Goal Number 2 at any cost, without care as to consequence, ignoring the reality that smallholders need enabling policies to enhance their role in food production; that food insecurity is linked to rights, processes, and unequal access to land resources; and that dispossession disproportionately affects women farmers. On this latter issue of gender, achieving zero hunger requires gender-inclusive land and labour policies. Actions must prioritise the inclusion of women and girls who are more food insecure than men in every region of the world. Women must have a right to land recognised and enshrined. The gender gap in food security has grown exponentially in recent years, and will only deteriorate further in the absence of targeted intervention. Women are obviously the most impacted victims of the food crisis, thus they must be a part of the solution. Women produce up to 80 percent of foodstuffs. Empowering women farmers can thus serve as a transformative tool for food security. However, female farmers have, research tell us, limited access to physical inputs, such as seeds and fertiliser, to markets, to storage facilities and this must be addressed. Climate change, and our response to it, addressing global hunger and global poverty, exposing and breaking dependency is a core theme of my Presidency. It is the most pressing existential crisis that our vulnerable planet and its global citizens face. Throughout the world, young people and the youth sector have been at the vanguard of efforts to tackle climate change. Young people have demonstrated, time and again, how well-informed and acutely aware they are of the threat that climate change poses, as well as its uneven and unequal impacts. May I suggest to all of you that, as young innovators and future leaders in your respective fields, you will be at your best, achieve the greatest fulfilment for yourself and others, when you locate your contribution within a commitment to be concerned and contributing global citizens. Take time to ask how is my energy in the tasks of hand and brain being delivered and for whose benefit. May I suggest, too, that you will be remembered and appreciated all the more if you work to ensure that the results of science, technology are shared and that all human endeavours are allowed to flow across borders for the human benefit of all and with a commitment to ecological responsibility and inclusivity. Offer your efforts where they can have the best effect for all. Locate yourselves in the heart of the populated world, as Nobel Laureate William Campbell did with his research on river blindness. Changing our food systems is, however, let us not forget, an intergenerational challenge that requires an inter-generational approach. We must now empower youth to be in the driver’s seat to build a new, better, transparent model of food security in a variety of different settings. Let us endeavour, together, in our diverse world, to seek to build a co-operative, caring and non-exploitative global civilisation free from hunger, a shared planet, a global family at peace with nature and neighbours, resilient to the climate change that is already occurring, one based on foundations of respect for each nation’s own institutions, traditions, experiences and wisdoms, founded on a recognition of the transcendent solidarity that might bind us together as humans, and reveal a recognition of the responsibility we share for our vulnerable planet and the fundamental dignity of all those who dwell on it. Thank you. Beir beannacht.

Energy & Economics
Paper based election process in Guatemala

Can Regional Governance Help Safeguard Guatemala’s Democracy?

by Tiziano Breda

Guatemala’s politics has recently been shaken by the victory of anti-corruption crusader Bernardo Arévalo de León, which has brought fresh air of hope in a country ridden by high levels of poverty, corruption and criminal violence. The result fits with the wave of anti-incumbent victories in Latin America: it is the 16th country in the region where an opposition candidate has been elected president in the past five years, out of 17 elections. But like or even more than in other countries, the electoral results are being contested by an astounded political and economic establishment unwilling to give its power away. Vicious attempts by judicial authorities to prevent Arévalo and his party’s congressmembers from taking office have raised domestic and international concerns that Guatemala may also join the growing list of Latin American countries experiencing setbacks in their democratic standards. The Organization of American States (OAS), a virtually moribund regional body that has proven unable to solve political crises and has at times even exacerbated them, has come back to the fore as the political forum where to coordinate a regional response. Will the Guatemalan case revive the fortunes of the OAS and will international accompaniment be enough to safeguard democracy in the country?  An impunity-prone status quo Guatemala is the biggest country in Central America and with the largest economy. It is also, however, among the most unequal, with around half of the population below the poverty line and suffering from high rates of malnutrition, especially among indigenous people, which account for 40 per cent of its population. It also hosted one of the most successful anti-corruption experiments in Latin America – the United Nations-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, 2007–2019) – which contributed to dismantling over 70 criminal networks encrusted in the country’s institutions involved in violence, drug trafficking and extortion activities. The zenith of this sweeping anti-corruption crusade was reached in 2015, when then-President Otto Pérez Molina eventually heeded the calls to resign by thousands of Guatemalans who protested in front of the presidential palace for months, after a CICIG-led investigation found him and his vice president involved in a large-scale corruption scheme involving the state customs. The lull, however, did not last long. Pérez Molina’s successor, Jimmy Morales, a former comedian, turned his back on the CICIG after the latter started investigating his brother and his son, and eventually shut it down in 2019. Since then, the country has experienced serious setbacks in its democratic institutions, as a coalition of political, economic and military elites (commonly dubbed as the Pact of Corrupts) scorched by CICIG-led investigations strived to re-establish an environment of impunity through the co-optation of the judiciary. The Attorney General Consuelo Porras, appointed by Morales and confirmed by his successor, the incumbent Alejandro Giammattei, turned out to be the most strenuous defender of these interests. Her office buried investigations into the president’s alleged acceptance of bribes by Russian contractors, and instead persecuted prosecutors, judges and journalists who had championed anti-corruption efforts, leading more than 30 of them to flee the country and jailing others on abuses of power charges. The boomerang effect of a tilted electoral game In the run-up to the 2023 election, growing popular disenchantment with the political class morphed into an anti-system sentiment. Authorities reacted by excluding from the race a number of well-polling candidates for alleged irregularities in their or their parties’ enrolment. However, this strategy boomeranged, and channelled the protest vote to the only remaining candidate that was perceived as external to the system: Bernardo Arévalo de León, running on an anti-corruption ticket for a tiny party called Semilla. Arévalo, who was polling below 3 per cent before the first electoral round, not only made it to the second round, but then obliterated the other run-off contender, former first-lady Sandra Torres from the UNE party, in a landslide victory on 20 August with an over 20 points lead. Arévalo’s party also obtained 23 seats in the upcoming legislature, more than three times its 2019 performance. Overall, the Guatemalan election results align with a regional trend of anti-incumbent victories in recent years, although in this case the winner is a progressive champion of democracy, instead of an anti-system populist, as had happened in El Salvador, Costa Rica and elsewhere in the region. The legal fightback against change Semilla’s unexpected result prompted the reaction of those same forces that had tried to channel the vote toward less dangerous candidates and that now put up a number of legal challenges to undermine the credibility of the election and disqualify the president-elect’s party. This strategy pivots around accusations of wrongdoings in the creation of Semilla that would erase its status as a legitimate party, and claims of fraud. Right after the first round, the Attorney General’s office opened investigations into alleged irregularities (fake signatures) upon Semilla’s creation, aiming to strip it of its legal status; this was coupled with accusations of abuse of power directed to Supreme Electoral Tribunal’s magistrates that certified the results. As a result, while Arévalo has been confirmed as president-elect, the Congress has already proceeded to strip the Semilla deputies elected in the 2019 elections – including Arévalo himself – of their seats. In parallel, nine parties obtained by the Supreme Court, allegedly close to the incumbent executive, a ruling in favour of a recount of the votes of the first round, questioning the findings of national and international observation missions, which did not report any broad irregularities. The recount ended with the officialisation of the results in mid-July, eventually assigning a few more votes to Semilla than originally reported. Yet, after the second round, Torres refused to concede and denounced a supposed fraud, despite the unequivocal margin separating her from Arévalo. Recently, the Attorney General’s office prosecutors even stormed the facilities where ballot boxes where stored, opening 160 of them, a move that electoral authorities considered illegal. After the prosecutors’ raid, Arévalo has eventually decided to halt the transition until the Attorney General resigns and ceases the political persecution. Domestic and international outcry The legal attempts to dismiss the will of change of Guatemalan voters have sparked a wave of public outcry in the country. It has also not gone unnoticed in the international arena. The electoral observation missions of the OAS and the European Union repeatedly expressed their rejection of any attempt to defy the electorate’s choice. The OAS Permanent Council discussed the situation in Guatemala and mandated the Secretary General to monitor the situation closely during the transition. The latter warned that the suspension of Semilla is a violation of the due process that Guatemala, being part of the Inter-American system, is mandated to respect. Strong public messaging also came from the US: government representatives, from President Biden to a bipartisan group of Congress members, have reiterated both privately and publicly their concerns and called on Guatemalan judicial authorities to stop undermining the country’s democracy. These domestic and international pressures may have contributed, together with the blatant arbitrariness of the judicial measures taken so far, to creating some fissures in the establishment. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, an accomplice in the run-up to the election with the disqualification of candidates, has now turned into a strenuous defender of the election results and proceeded to officialise them despite the legal challenges and Torres’s party’s refusal to concede. At the political level, two ministers (Economy and Energy and Mining) resigned from their posts, while a few politicians from across the spectrum decried the obstructionism against Semilla. Most notably, a few private sector chambers and even the country’s largest business confederation, known as CACIF, issued public statements in defence of the integrity of the vote and calling on institutions to let the electoral process come to completion. Against this backdrop, President Giammattei is believed to be playing a double game. In public, he has opened the door to Arévalo for an orderly transition, inviting OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro to oversee the process. At the same time, however, he has remained silent on the apparent political persecution of Semilla by the judiciary and legislature. The need to keep Guatemala in the spotlight Notwithstanding, the remnants of the current political establishment appear to be eager to defy the public outcry within and without the country. The fate of Consuelo Porras, in particular, seems intrinsically linked to the preservation of the status quo by reducing as much as possible Arévalo’s margin of action. While Arévalo’s victory seems hard to overturn at this stage, this cannot be ruled out completely until all claims of fraud are dismissed and the transition to the new administration is completed in January 2024. This would be a dismal scenario, which would likely lead Guatemala into the abyss of a full-blown coup d’état, with unpredictable consequences in terms of social turmoil and international isolation. At the same time, however, the legal cases against Semilla are likely to advance, unless they are denounced as political persecution by the widest array of sectors in the country. The suspension of the party would affect Arévalo’s ability to set the legislative agenda, already quite limited from the start, having Semilla won only 23 out of the 160 seats. Constant engagement of regional governments and statements from political and economic sectors should help prevent this. The task is particularly delicate for the OAS, whose legitimacy has been tainted by its inability to craft a coordinated, principle-based response to some of the political and electoral crises that have affected the region in recent years, particularly Nicaragua, Venezuela and Bolivia. Critics have accused the body of approaching crises with an ideological bias: it has occasionally dismissed complaints of undemocratic moves in such countries as Brazil, El Salvador and Honduras when they were under conservative rule, while advancing allegations of fraud without solid evidence, which in turn fuelled tensions in Bolivia in 2019. Guatemala offers an opportunity for the OAS to wash away the perception of being politically biased and reposition itself as the most suitable regional forum to handle the crises arising from violations of the principles enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. To do so, however, concrete results are needed. Regional governments will have to agree on the reputational and diplomatic costs that the actors trying to overturn the election may encounter, and be prepared to enforce them. These may include scaling down cooperation with judicial authorities and, if Arévalo were eventually prevented from taking office, the activation of the democratic clause of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which may lead to the suspension of Guatemala from the OAS. Additionally, they should coordinate closely with the EU and other partners to maintain Guatemala in the spotlight and engage regularly with Guatemalan authorities to convey their commitment to the cause for democracy in the country. Intermittently monitoring the situation or simply paying lip service may not only keep judicial actions unscathed, thus setting a dangerous precedent in Guatemala’s hardly-fought democracy, but also embolden corrupt actors across the Western Hemisphere to follow Porras’s footsteps.

Energy & Economics
miniature people figure businessman standing on united states of america map on globe as world leader decision concept

Washington Declaration: Beyond Korea, What it Means for India?

by Jagannath P. Panda

In April 2023, South Korea and the United States released the Washington Declaration to reiterate and upgrade their treaty alliance. In outlining a joint nuclear deterrence strategy, the Declaration reaffirmed that South Korea would not pursue independent nuclear capabilities, and instead continue to rely on the alliance-based approach. This paper considers the strategic impact of the Washington Declaration beyond the U.S.-ROK nexus. Highlighting the importance of the agreement on security and stability in the broader Indo-Pacific region, this paper focuses on India’s stake in the new development. In particular, this paper emphasizes that despite its stated focus on the North Korean nuclear threat, the Washington Declaration also considers the Chinese and Russian threats in the region, making it of immense interest to India. It analyzes whether and how the Washington Declaration can complement India’s interests, and the potential for it to pave the way towards a closer India-U.S.-South Korea trilateral partnership in the Indo-Pacific.  Introduction  The release of the Washington Declaration in April 2023 has not just temporarily halted the Republic of Korea’s (ROK or South Korea) ambitions of developing its own nuclear weapons, but has also given more attention to the debates on nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Even as the United States is concerned about growing nuclear developments in China, Russia, and North Korea (or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), it is primarily focused on countering China – “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security.” Given that China’s military activities in its extended neighborhood, including in the Taiwan Strait, South and East China Seas, and the Himalayan borderwith India, have attained built greater momentum in the past decade, the Declaration assumes greater significance: As a forward-looking step to mollify U.S. treaty allies and partners in the region with the larger aim of bolstering a “cooperative” approach against the growing nuclear threat.  In this context, even as the Washington Declaration does not directly impact India, its implications for the IndoPacific amid India’s substantial role in the budding IndoPacific security architecture compels a closer examination into the new debates centered on South Korea’s extended deterrence. India is a “special strategic partner” for the ROK: Post the launch of the ROK’s Indo-Pacific strategy in December 2022, the two are exploring their increasing strategic convergence via respective inclusive policies as “pivotal” Indo-Pacific partners. Therefore, the security concerns in East Asia are not just important for India because of the domino effect on South Asia—home to near-perpetual instability due to the three nuclear states of China, India, and Pakistan—but also in terms of the negative impact on India’s (as yet) nascent efforts to boost multilateralism, middle power coalition, and regional integration.  Can New Delhi capitalize on South Korea’s gains from the U.S.’ latest declaration against North Korea’s and China’s nuclear threats? Could the Washington Declaration complement an envisioned India-ROK-U.S. trilateral in today’s divisive geopolitics? Could the new nuclear debates focusing on extended deterrence engender mechanisms for strengthening South Asian nuclear stability? Contextualizing the Washington Declaration Beyond the Peninsula Undoubtedly, the bilateral summit, including the Declaration will have an impact not just on the ROK but also on all stakeholders in the region—from U.S. partners like Japan and India to nuclear rivals China, Russia, and North Korea. What does the new pact bring to the fore for the ROK? In what ways will the latest U.S. approach to the Korean Peninsula affect the Indo-Pacific security landscape and partnerships, particularly for India?  Parsing the Declaration – (Not) New Significance for ROK?  In April 2023, the ROK-U.S. bilateral summit in Washington commemorated the 70th anniversary of the ironclad U.S.-ROK alliance—the duo’s dynamics have evolved from security treaty allies under the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in October 1953, to global comprehensive strategic allies in May 2022. Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol, through their joint statement, press conference, and a separate “Washington Declaration”, reiterated the shared commitment under the Mutual Defense Treaty, as well as toward establishing peace and stability in the IndoPacific. Moreover, Yoon’s state visit resulted in a stream of “political understandings” that ranged from billion-dollar economic and environmental tie-ups to technological and developmental cooperation. However, the event that has grabbed the maximum eyeballs is the Washington Declaration—unveiling new measures to concretize the “ambitious path” to secure the U.S.-ROK defense and global security cooperation and advance shared priorities in the Indo-Pacific.  This new pact claims to further the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence measures—referring to modernizing the U.S. capabilities, including nuclear forces, to deter attacks on allies, as also discourage allies from going nuclear, in the increasingly threatening regional security environment. For instance, the U.S. has constituted at the assistant secretary level a Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to assuage the ROK about the U.S.’ intent to formulate a consensus-based approach to handling the North Korean threat. This includes not just enhancing deployment of U.S. strategic assets, including nuclearcapable platforms, in and around the Korean Peninsula, but also augmented information-sharing, joint contingency planning, and an inter-agency table-top simulation. One of the most important objectives of this comprehensive outcome was to showcase to the domestic public in South Korea that the U.S. is a long-term reliable security partner—while also exemplifying the same for the other U.S. allies and partners in the region, such as Japan.  The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral is a central aspect in the Northeast Asia deterrence measures given that they face common threats from North Korea. Yoon has already opened the doors for a “three-way” strategic and nuclear planning “at any time” in the future to boost the combined response to a nuclear contingency: “The Washington Declaration is a bilateral agreement between Korea and the U.S., but we do not rule out Japan’s participation.” Already, there are speculations about Japan joining the NCG. For the present, the three countries have agreed to strengthen trilateral military cooperation including regularizing ballistic missile defense exercises and antisubmarine warfare exercises. They have also initiated efforts toward a “data sharing mechanism to exchange realtime missile warning data before the end of the year,” in line with the November 2022 trilateral leaders’ summit commitments.  At the same time, the Declaration has put on hold, even if temporarily, South Korean goals to build autonomous nuclear weapons. Yoon, who has been facing criticism at home for not heeding the extraordinary public support for acquiring an indigenous nuclear weapons program, had earlier this year stirred up a hornet’s nest by openly declaring nuclear weapons development as a possible policy option, which at the very least pushes the U.S. to re-deploy nuclear weapons. However, the Declaration clearly reaffirms the ROK’s continued commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the new 123 Agreement, with the U.S. president as the “sole authority” to launch nuclear weapons. It has therefore curtailed any independent nuclear notions for the near future and only served to strengthen the ROK’s alignment with the U.S. view of the global non-proliferation regime.  Consequently, the response in the South Korean media was subdued, if not sweepingly critical. Despite Yoon hailing the alliance as “nuclear based”, polls conducted during April-May 2023 (by the Korea Institute for National Unification, KINU) showed a significant drop in public support for the ROK going nuclear, especially in cognizance of the risks involved. The ROK government describing the Declaration as a Mutual Defense Treaty 2.0 or attesting to its “nuclear sharing” aspect have been touted as “false claims”; U.S. officials have also noted that the Washington Declaration is not a “de facto nuclear-sharing” agreement.  Importantly, questions have been raised domestically about South Korea paying a “high price” in return for “hardly … any substantive changes” in the U.S. nuclear policy on South Korea—sharply referred to by some domestic critics as “a redundant declaration produced by mutual distrust in the South Korea-U.S. alliance.” In concrete terms, the pact has been likened to the “jettisoning” of South Korea’s right to protect itself from the nuclear threat from North Korea—U.S. President Biden has categorically stated that he has the “absolute” authority as commanderin-chief to use nuclear weapons even though it would be in consultation with the allies. There are also legitimate concerns about the agreement having turned China and Russia into “de facto adversaries”. Misgivings have also been raised about the lack of U.S. assurance on increased business and investment ties, including in semiconductors and green technologies—areas where closer ties with the U.S. could help reduce Korean dependence on China.  The Chinese state media has raised serious concerns about the ROK “sacrificing” its “win-win” economic ties with China, but at present, maintains that “cooperation remains an irreversible trend in the long run.” Regarding these worries, some political observers in Seoul have contended that the ROK need not go back to its “strategic ambiguity” approach to pursue economic ties with China. This is primarily because countering China’s rise as a strategic challenge while maximizing economic benefits is a concern faced not only by the ROK but all liberal democracies in the present complex, transitional geopolitical scenario. Notably, the North Korean response has been predictable, calling it an opportunity for the DPRK to “perfect” its nuclear option; the official DPRK statement labeling it a “nominal” declaration highlights that the Kim regime sees it as business as usual.  A disconcerting aspect of the Declaration, even though it is in line with the sentiment of the times, has been the relegation of “pursuit of dialogue and diplomacy” with North Korea to a byline at the end. It indicates a closing of doors on diplomacy, albeit with a rogue state (namely the DPRK) unwilling to compromise, but nonetheless important given the near-consensus about the Declaration being an “evolution” in deterrence but not a panacea for the peninsular concerns. Some have also contended that “these outcomes will likely not provide enduring solutions to the North Korea challenge.”  Another notable issue that would have impacted the U.S.- ROK summit is the fallout from leaked U.S. intelligence documents, days before Yoon’s state visit, which suggested that the United States was spying on one of its foremost treaty allies. There are concerns in South Korea that the U.S. has “already penetrated into the Korean government’s networks and intercepted communications, possibly including phone and email.” As the U.S. has been accused of spying on the ROK in 2013, too, when its extensive surveillance program was exposed in press reports, the mistrust between the allies is likely to re-surface time and again. Therefore, in view of the South Korean government’s restlessness and nuclear claims prior to the April joint statement, there is some truth to the assertion that the Declaration arises out of the need to downplay the U.S. allies’ misgivings and trust issues. Its importance hence lies in shoring up of the U.S.-ROK partnership amid fears of the current security situation in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific becoming worse due to the growing divisions in global geopolitics. Nonetheless, Yoon’s embrace of “strategic clarity” for the Indo-Pacific construct; sanctions on Russia during the Ukraine war; the success in resuming the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral in the past year; and the importance accorded to Yoon’s state visit, including the broad-ranging joint statement and the not-so-definitive yet formidable Washington Declaration, all highlight that the upward trajectory of the U.S.-ROK bonhomie is not a superfluous achievement. It points to a steady, forwardlooking alliance with implications for the wider IndoPacific. Ascertaining India’s Interests At a broader level, for the Indo-Pacific, especially for U.S. allies and partners in the region, the 2023 Washington Declaration is a sign of the U.S.’ willingness to negotiate the partners’ growing need for an inclusive, if not entirely equal, cooperation mechanism. Such an approach will not only strengthen the respective bilaterals with the United States but also present a stronger coalition in the fight against both North Korea and China. The latter is intent on destabilizing the existing status quo through its military aggression—from the Taiwan Strait to the Himalayas.  For India, which has been facing the brunt of China’s military tactics along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with an increased frequency in the past decade, the Washington Declaration highlights a strengthening of like-minded partnerships in the continuing democratic face-off against China. Thus, the Declaration’s impact is felt in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, including India’s immediate neighborhood— particularly as it compels the ROK to sharpen its global pivotal leadership by embedding itself deeper in the U.S.- led Indo-Pacific construct. Though the Declaration is specifically targeted against North Korea, not China, the evolving alliance is a response to the ever-growing threats in and around the Korean Peninsula, as well as in broader Asia: From Central Asia to the Middle East; the Himalayan States to the Indian Ocean; the South China Sea to the East China Sea, China’s diplomatic-economic clout and military presence is growing. In short, the Chinese threat is the main concern for the U.S.  As a result, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning was stringent in his criticism of the new pact: “What the U.S. is doing ... provokes confrontation between camps, undermines the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the strategic interests of other countries.” China was also immediate to voice its opposition against Japan’s potential involvement through the Washington Declaration, after Yoon was positive about turning the bilateral agreement into a trilateral one in the future. The inclusion of the phrase “peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits” and critical technologies cooperation in the joint statement also raised hackles in China in terms of South Korea isolating China and crossing its red lines.  China sees this agreement as another U.S. tool to strengthen a values-based security coalition in the region à la Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States). The Quad’s successful bonhomie has not only inspired other such U.S.- led platforms (e.g., the latest with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines and the West Asian one with India, Israel, and the UAE) but has also become a thorn in the side of China’s goals of regional dominance. Any deterrence for China’s growing ambitions is in India’s interests, which is not only facing a continental threat but also recognizes China’s growing reach in India’s traditional stronghold of the Indian Ocean region.  Consequently, despite not being directly connected to this agreement, India may nonetheless benefit from the Washington Declaration in a number of ways both in the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, the Declaration is critical to increasing the Quad’s strength. The reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to its Indo-Pacific allies and partners, including India, will not only boost the Quad but also set the stage for renewed deliberations on the Quad “Plus” framework, of which the ROK is a part, thereby opening up more avenues of India-ROK collaboration. In turn, such integration of South Korea with the Quad will further push the North Korean agenda onto the Quad’s table.  Secondly, in response to Chinese (and North Korean) aggression, the Washington Declaration emphasizes the need for maintaining the status quo in the Indo-Pacific and rejects any illegitimate maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and coercive actions. This might be seen as normal diplo-speak; however, it will further concretize the ROK’s aims to build greater maritime collaborations, including naval deterrence capabilities, in the Indo-Pacific. For instance, the Chungnam frigate (FFX), launched by South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) in April 2023, will be incorporated into the ROK Navy— its second-largest naval expense. Such an investment is poised to contribute to stronger South Korean presence in the Indo-Pacific in line with its newly launched IndoPacific strategy. It is a positive development for India, which is looking to bolster its IOR presence through likeminded partners like the ROK, the European Union and its members, and Japan.  Here, it is also important to note that even though the ROK has traded off its nuclear development ambitions for “deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence” in the Washington Declaration, the road to fulfilling its nuclear-based ambitions has not closed down. In the future, for instance, Seoul might still be inclined to renew its post-AUKUS (Australia-UK-U.S. defense pact) demands to gain access to the U.S.’ nuclear-power submarine technology. India, which is one of the few countries to have nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile launch capabilities, can use this opportunity to further increase naval exercises with the ROK, along with making a stronger push towards defense technology and manufacturing collaborations.  Thirdly, India and South Korea are strengthening their bilateral and regional relationship based on democratic and inclusive visions, characterized by the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Their future-oriented partnership has a sound foundational convergence, namely the Act East Policy (AEP)-New Southern Policy (NSP) Plus connect. Notably, the degree to which the Yoon government embraces India’s AEP (and Indo-Pacific vision) will not only determine the natural progression of India-South Korea regional relations but also provide momentum to diversification goals. The latter is important in light of the ROK’s growing security and techno-economic dependence on the United States at the cost of neglecting its long-standing economic partner China, as underscored by the latest joint statement and China’s response to it.  In this context, India’s and the ROK’s quest for economic security, through participation in various regional and panregional forums, will enable them to build strategic links, and work together to balance regional developmental goals and their own economic-military growth. Both countries can use their participation in platforms like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to build a stronger economic partnership. For example, the ROK, which joined the AIIB in 2015 and is the fifth-largest stakeholder of the AIIB with its shares at 3.86 percent, is looking to expand ties and find new joint project opportunities. India, as a founding member and the second largest shareholder with the largest project portfolio within AIIB, could facilitate the ROK’s enhanced contributions in the bank’s turn toward green infrastructure for providing “high-quality development finance.” India and ROK’s participation in forums like the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) and the U.S.- led Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) respectively, can help them coordinate their actions as they look to diversify critical value chains. The contested Asian and Indo-Pacific landscape has made supply chain diversification a priority. As U.S.-China trade and technological competition makes economic security vital, India and South Korea can build on their natural complementarities and work together to restructure their supply chains to reduce reliance on Chinacontrolled supply chains. While South Korea can support India’s goal of emerging as a manufacturing hub for key industries, India can be an important partner in South Korea’s aim to diversify its economic partnerships beyond China under the NSP.  Lastly, if South Korea heeds to domestic criticism about “jettisoning” its strategic autonomy (that is, deferring to the U.S. by not acquiring a nuclear weapons development program), it will continue to diversify its partners, particularly in defense manufacturing and new technologies. Given that India and the ROK have expanded their defense cooperation, including joint production and export of military hardware, in recent years, the new pact will allow the ROK to push boundaries. For instance, the ROK could continue supporting India’s membership bid for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or the MSP and India could facilitate South Korea’s increased participation in the Quad, a much-desired goal for Yoon.  Moreover, ROK-India could partner for peaceful nuclear purposes. At present, India does not allow foreign direct investment in the nuclear power sector, but as per Indian media reports, the government is mulling changes in the near future. Their coming closer together, which is already in motion, will consolidate the middle power-dominated multipolar Asia architecture, primarily to mitigate the constraints due to the growing bipolar rivalry. It will further their common goal to achieve a global standing while preserving strategic autonomy. U.S.-ROK-India: A Trilateral Inches Closer? The latest U.S.-ROK summit and the Washington Declaration have certainly strengthened the U.S.-led alliance structure in the region, giving partners outside this alliance hope for a consultative and cooperative security mechanism for the region, U.S. primacy notwithstanding. What is clear is that a democratic values-based coalition will be able to successfully maneuver the ups and downs through the times and give impetus to the new-era security, economic, technological, and diplomatic cooperation. In this vein, the Declaration could be seen as a clarion call for unity to deal with the current hostile regional and global geopolitical circumstances. The boost to the Japan-ROKU.S. trilateral through this pact, as well as the bilateral summit’s assertion to implement their respective IndoPacific strategies while enhancing “Indo-Pacific voices in multilateral forums, especially in addressing climate change, sustainable energy access, and food insecurity,” could pave the way for other minilateral coalitions.  India as a vital cog in the Indo-Pacific security network will naturally play a significant role. India’s increasing closeness to the United States as a counterweight to China and a strategic partner, especially in defense and technological areas, for a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) makes it an important component in today’s U.S.-led liberal order, which is at a transition stage. Moreover, the bonhomie with South Korea is based on growing common values and interests of assertive middle powers, including strategic autonomy and global governance aspirations.  India will be closely watching to see whether Seoul’s emphatic turn to “strategic clarity,”—first with its “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” and now the Washington Declaration—will enable the ROK to fulfill its middle power potential as a “technological, economic powerhouse.” In other words, for India, the new ROK approach could enable a deeper strategic connect between the two partners by moving beyond economic and limited regional ambitions. The new goals would have to include extended joint military exercises, joint manufacturing of defense equipment, expanded connectivity (digital and physical), regional integration initiatives, global supply chain resilience, increased green technology sharing, effective critical mineral collaborations (to lower dependency on China and Russia), and technological norms building, among others.  Importantly, as both India and the ROK have signed the respective 123 Agreement with the U.S. on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there is potential for cooperation in the power sector, as well as via technical exchanges, scientific research, and safeguards discussions. In March 2018, India and South Korea signed a bilateral civil nuclear agreement that allowed Korean companies to participate in India’s civil nuclear industry (including in atomic power plant projects and selling nuclear reactors to India). With energy security front and center on the global agenda in wake of the Ukraine crisis, trilateral cooperation in the civil nuclear sector can be an important step forward. Notably, nuclear exports are an important part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By 2030, China plans to build about 30 nuclear reactors abroad, worth $145.5 billion; it has already built four nuclear reactors in Pakistan (and is now building two more), has signed agreements to build reactors in Argentina, entered the UK nuclear market, and is currently negotiating with several other countries including Saudi Arabia and Kazakhstan. Amid the ongoing energy crisis, China’s foray into the global nuclear market could give it greater influence and potentially enhance its coercive power. In this context, the U.S., South Korea, and India have reason to bolster cooperation in this area and ensure they can stand as competitive nuclear vendors against China’s offer of advanced technology, competitive prices, and rich financing.  India, the ROK and the U.S. have several shared interests and are already engaged in high-level cooperation at bilateral and multilateral levels; as such, a trilateral between the three powers would help coordinate their actions in pursuit of their regional goals. At the same time, for India and the ROK, any such trilateral cooperation could serve to provoke China and make managing the U.S.-China equation much more difficult. Nevertheless, while India faces a belligerent China on its border and South Korea is dealing with an economically coercive China, a trilateral partnership could be necessary to bolster collaborations and further shared interests. Furthermore, the benefits of a U.S.-ROK-India trilateral would be equally distributed to not just the three countries, but also other regional powers. Improvement of ties between Japan and South Korea—which is shaping up to be a focal point of both Yoon’s and Fumio Kishida’s leadership legacies—will gain smoother and faster traction owing to Japan’s close ties with India and the alliance with the U.S. Australia and Indonesia, too, have responded positively to South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The establishment of a new U.S.- led defense-ministerial level quadrilateral mechanism with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines is another shot in the arm for “allied and like-minded” countries. Therefore, the U.S.-India-ROK trilateral would draw on the bilateral gains and their common belief in ASEAN centrality to further regional integration aims. This will also give impetus to Seoul and Delhi (and also Canberra) emerging as strong candidates for an extended G-7. Overall, the Declaration sets the stage for a strong U.S.-ROK camaraderie that will extend beyond nuclear deterrence goals, impacting broader regional multilateral dynamics of the Indo-Pacific. Lessons for South Asian Nuclear Dynamics: Potential for Reassurance and Deterrence? In many ways, the Washington Declaration seeks to be a show of strength—and a reprieve—against the North Korean nuclear threat that has rapidly escalated over the past year with the sudden rise in missile tests and an expanding nuclear program. Since his election for presidency, Yoon has frequently expressed willingness for South Korea to be a more active player in the Indo-Pacific, including by being a part of the Quad framework. The Declaration is a part of Seoul’s efforts to meet its security goals. While it is certainly a significant step to counter the North Korean threat, it is also an indication of a stronger alliance against provocative actions by China. The bolstered U.S.-ROK partnership under the Declaration is a step towards a more proactive and stronger South Korea in the region, and could eventually ease the way for Seoul’s productive involvement in the Quad, perhaps through a Plus framework. While South Korea will still need to establish itself as a reliable partner with the other members of the Quad, the Declaration certainly demonstrates its commitment to regional (and global) security, and by extension, the important role it can play through greater interaction and burden-sharing with the Quad.  Undoubtedly, this new bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the ROK (potentially also involving Japan through the trilateral) will usher in new lessons for the wider Indo-Pacific, and in turn for India, too. For instance, the prospects of closer consultations that will strengthen the combined defense posture are relevant for not just U.S. treaty allies like the ROK and Japan but central strategic security partners like India that is facing a two-front border escalation with China and Pakistan. However, could this new deterrence declaration in Northeast Asia pave the way for a common strategic mechanism between the U.S. and India that enhances deterrence and provides a degree of reassurance against the growing nuclear risk in South Asia?  As much as it is possible that the U.S. extended deterrence for ROK would fuel an arms race, as also underscored by Russia and China in their response to the Declaration, not just in Northeast Asia but also in nuclear-heavy South Asia, it is often contended that “the drivers of nuclear instability in the region have more to do with conventional warfighting strategies.” The grave escalation in 2019 between India and Pakistan is one such example, and the accidental firing of a missile into Pakistan’s territory in 2022 that fortunately did not result in a retaliatory attack is another—both highlight the need to pursue definitive de-escalation and crisis management measures, and the latter puts a spotlight on the current fragility of the South Asian situation. The danger of an accidental nuclear war in such tense conflicts has not been stressed enough, and it bears repeating that such a threat was a constant refrain during the Cold War posturing.  Broadly speaking, today, India and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT but have been gradually increasing their nuclear arsenals. China is a nuclear weapons state recognized by the NPT, and has accelerated its nuclear development program. All are developing newer “ballistic missile, cruise missile, and sea-based nuclear delivery systems.” As of January 2023, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was about 170 warheads (by some estimates the stockpile might go up to about 200 by 2025), China’s about 410 nuclear warheads; and India’s about 164 nuclear weapons.  Moreover, while India and China both have declared nofirst-use (NFU) policies, Pakistan has no such policy; its “full spectrum deterrence posture,” especially the development of tactical nuclear weapons capabilities for use on the battlefield to offset India’s (superior) conventional military tactics has been of concern to not just India but the United States as well. At the same time, recently questions have been raised about China shifting its nuclear policies, including the NFU, because of the nuclear expansion and modernization. Vis-à-vis India, too, there are speculations that “India could be transitioning towards a counterforce nuclear posture to target an adversary’s nuclear weapons earlier in a crisis, even before they could be used.”  In this context, controlling escalation is not a conclusive plan of action, and dialogue, too, has limitations when the live-wire conflict, as it is with both India-Pakistan and IndiaChina, has historical roots and nuclear leverage. Also, India has called nuclear risk reduction an “interim” strategy; and as per its security review in 2003, India retains the option of nuclear weapons in the event of an attack by chemical and biological weapons. However, as part of its doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, including the NFU and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, India is “prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements.”  Therefore, for South Asia, the U.S. and its partners, including India, need to focus on building creative, reliable mechanisms for limiting the possibilities of crossing the nuclear threshold, as well as controlling the use of highprecision conventional weapons. For example, India, Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. should either as a new minilateral or in conjunction with Quad (Plus) strengthen a strategic dialogue that looks into ways of information sharing, including intelligence on nuclear threats in the sub-region, as well as take into account India’s pursuit of “global, verifiable and non-discriminatory” multilateral legal arrangements for a nuclear weapon free world.  Importantly, a vital tool that should be widely used is the dissemination of information about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the limitations of ballistic missiles among the public and policymakers. Lessons must be drawn from the South Korean scenario where public survey results in the recent past have highlighted a concerning trend of a high degree of support for nuclear weapons deployment without fully being made aware of the pitfalls. A recent study revealed that even in the U.S. and the UK, there is a lack of awareness about “nuclear winter”—a term used to illustrate the potential “catastrophic long-term environmental consequences from any exchange of nuclear warheads”— and that even brief exposure to these risks reduces the public’s support for nuclear retaliation. The dramatic lowering of public support for nuclear development is seen in the latest (aforementioned) KINU survey in the ROK, too, when presented with different possibilities of risks. Raising awareness and educating the public and decision-makers about such risks should also be part of the state’s strategy to reduce the heightened perceptions about nuclear weapons: the responsibility surely lies to a large degree on national governments and relevant multilateral organizations, which seem to have been caught napping.  In the wake of the Washington Declaration, which has rekindled the nuclear debates in the Indo-Pacific, it is imperative that concerted efforts be made by all stakeholders, especially the nuclear states and the ones desirous of autonomous nuclear weapons capabilities, to first raise regional public awareness about the ramifications of nuclear armament, and only then pursue responsible deterrence measures.

Energy & Economics
Collision of shipment containers with Chinese and US flags

Drivers of U.S.-China Strategic Competition

by Stephen R. Nagy

Understanding the Chinese Perspective The relationship between the United States and China is one of the most important and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world. Nonetheless, it is also complex and contentious, with both countries vying for geopolitical influence and economic dominance. This brief examines drivers of U.S.-China strategic competition from the perspective of Beijing incorporating the prism of MarxistLeninist ideology, domestic politics in the U.S., China's needed alignment with Russia, nationalism, technological advancements such as AI, the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the E.U., and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Understanding this analytical lens contributes to deeper comprehension of China's security anxieties and world view that may provide insight to enhance engagement, resilience, and deterrence in bilateral relations with China. Introduction The relationship between the United States and China is one of the most important and mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in the world today. To illustrate, according to data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), total imports and exports grew 2.5 percent year-on-year to reach US$690.6 billion in 2022, breaking the previous record of US$658.8 billion set in 2018. This increase is despite the divisions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and mutual unfavorable ratings. Nonetheless, the U.S.-China relationship is also complex and contentious, with both countries vying for geopolitical influence and economic dominance. Whether it is the rules-based Free and Open IndoPacific or the realization of Xi Jinping’s China dream, the competition for primacy between the U.S. and China will impact friends, partners, and foes of both states. Viewed from Beijing, Chinese scholars and analysts base their assessment of the trajectory of the U.S.-China strategic competition through several lens including the prism of Marxist-Leninist ideology, domestic politics in the U.S., China’s needed alignment with Russia, nationalism, technological advancements such as AI, the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the EU, and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). Shaped by Marxist-Leninist Ideology Marxist-Leninist ideology has played a leading if not central role in shaping the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) approach to governance and foreign relations. The CCP came to power in 1949 following a successful revolution led by Mao Zedong. Mao was heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought. Since then, the CCP has maintained a commitment to Marxist-Leninist ideology, although its interpretation and application have evolved over time. Today, as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and author of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China writes, Xi’s China leans left in terms of Marxist-Leninist socio-economic organization and right in terms of nationalism. Rudd’s analysis echoes President Xi’s speech on “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects” in his report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC. In that speech, Xi stressed that “Marxism is the fundamental guiding ideology upon which our Party and our country are founded and thrive. Our experience has taught us that, at the fundamental level, we owe the success of our Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics to the fact that Marxism works, particularly when it is adapted to the Chinese context and the needs of our times.” At its core, Marxist-Leninist ideology emphasizes the importance of class struggle and the need for the working class to overthrow the ruling class to achieve a classless society. In the Chinese context, this has translated into a focus on creating a socialist society and promoting the welfare of the Chinese people under the umbrella term ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. In terms of China’s relationship with the U.S., Marxist-Leninist ideology has contributed to a view of the U.S. as a capitalist and imperialist power that seeks to undermine China’s socialist system. This view is rooted in the Marxist-Leninist belief that capitalist powers are inherently expansionist and seek to dominate other countries to secure their own economic and political interests. They see the U.S. as an imperialist power seeking to maintain its hegemony over the world, while China represents a rising power challenging the established order, as written by Graham Allison in his book Thucydides’ Trap. Chinese analysts believe that the U.S. is threatened by China’s rise and is seeking to contain it through various means, including economic sanctions, military posturing, and diplomatic pressure as evidenced by the Trump administration’s trade war, its network of alliances throughout the region, the advent of minilateral cooperation such as the Quad and AUKUS, and the perceived fomenting of independent movements in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Taiwan.  They argue that the U.S. is using its military alliances and partnerships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia to encircle China and limit its influence in the region. These perspectives ignore that the U.S. alongside with Japan and others openly supported China’s entry into the WTO, the 2008 Summer Olympics, and gave China a leadership position at the Paris Climate Accord. These initiatives demonstrated that the U.S. and other countries were willing to work with China on global issues and support its development. Destabilizing Influence of U.S. Domestic Politics While Marxist-Leninist perspectives of U.S.-China relations offer a macro-level understanding of how China views the inevitability of great power rivalry between Washington and Beijing, Chinese analysts also pay close attention to domestic politics in the U.S. and its impact on U.S.-China relations. Chinese analysts believe that the current political climate in the U.S. is highly polarized, and that these domestic political dynamics are affecting U.S. foreign policy, including its stance towards China. They see the Trump administration’s trade war with China as a reflection of this polarization, and argue that it has damaged the relationship between the two countries. They also note that the Biden administration has continued many of the same policies as the Trump administration, including maintaining tariffs on Chinese goods and pursuing a tough stance on technology transfer and intellectual property theft. The build-up to the 2024 presidential election for most will be one of intensifying securitization of relations with China. President Biden will not be in a position to show any weakness in his China policy. Equally so, the Republicans, whether it is former President Trump or an alternative GOP candidate will take an “All because of China” approach, when it comes to foreign policy, like advocating for a hard decoupling of the economies or even more provocatively, possibly migrating away or redefining the “One China” policy. Developing China-Russian Alignment Chinese analysts also view the relationship between China and Russia as an important factor in the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They see the two countries as natural partners, sharing a common interest in challenging U.S. dominance of the world. They believe that the China-Russia all-weather partnership is growing stronger and that it poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests. For Russia, Pax Sinica would offer it a much more hospitable environment than the one provided by the Pax Americana, according to the authors of The Beijing-Moscow Axis: The Foundations of an Asymmetric Alliance published by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). For China, a tightening of the alignment with Russia will be critical to ensuring that U.S. does not drive a wedge between China and Russia by pursuing a policy of containment against both countries, a policy that Chinese analysts view as unlikely to succeed. The invasion of Ukraine is a case in point. Despite Russia’s invasion violating the U.N. Charter and China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, Beijing has taken a pro-Russian neutrality position refusing to condemn Russia. This is not an endorsement of the invasion or of Putin. It is a clear indication of the importance China places on the deepening Sino-Russian alignment and the reality that neither country can afford a geopolitical divorce. In fact, the recent paper ‘China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis’ continues to echo President Xi’s Workers Report at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, which explicitly used the expression that “no country’s security should come at the expense of another country’s security,” an explicit rejection of the U.S. and Western countries’ views that Russia has engaged in an unprovoked attack against the sovereign state of Ukraine.  Intensifying Nationalism Chinese nationalism is another important factor by which Chinese analysts understand the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They view Chinese nationalism as a natural response to the country’s history of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, including the U.S. Carefully curated since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Zheng Wang writes in his book Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations that Beijing has placed the century of humiliation at the center of China’s national building process and a nationalist movement in which victimhood, national rejuvenation, and a perineal sense of insecurity concerning the West and particularly the U.S. is the major pillar. These narratives have been meticulously manipulated and deployed to build a national identity in which China must resist anti-China forces and those states that wish to prevent “China’s rightful rise.” Events such as the 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and World Anti-Fascist War, 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, or national aspirations such as the China Dream are all constructed with the purpose of infusing into Chinese citizens a nationalism linked to the CCP’s selective understanding of history. Based on these selective views of history, scholars such as Qin Pang in their co-authored article on “China’s Growing Power Makes Its Youth Hawkish?” Evidence from the Chinese Youth’s Attitudes toward the U.S. and Japan’ find that Chinese citizens view the United States as seeking to contain China’s rise and limit its influence in the region, and that this is seen by many Chinese as an affront to their national pride. Chinese analysts believe that Chinese nationalism is a powerful force that will shape the country's foreign policy for years to come, and that it will continue to be a source of tension in U.S.-China relations. For the U.S. and other like-minded states, Chinese nationalism that is based on victimhood, national rejuvenation, and a perennial sense of insecurity concerning the West will not be a platform for stabilizing and creating constructive relations, especially if this nationalism drives territorial expansion in the South and East China Seas, the Himalayan plateau or across the Taiwan straits.  Dominating AI and Other Technologies  The rapid advancement of technology, particularly in the areas of AI and 5G, is another factor that Chinese analysts believe will shape the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They see China as a leader in these areas, with the potential to surpass the United States in terms of technological innovation and economic growth. Chinese analysts argue that the U.S. is threatened by China’s technological progress and is seeking to limit its access to advanced technology, particularly in the areas of AI and 5G. They also believe that the United States is using national security concerns as a pretext for restricting Chinese access to these technologies. The U.S. Chips Act and the growing first tier semiconductor and technology firewall that is being erected around China by the U.S. in cooperation with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands and Taiwan demonstrate the centrality the U.S places on dominating these spheres of technology. The consequence for China according to analysts in and out of China is that it will no longer have access to the most sophisticated semi-conductors, semiconductor producing machines and the associated expertise to keep up in the race to be the first mover when it comes to AI and other technologies that rely on first tier semi-conductor chips. In concrete terms, this means that as the U.S. and its allies will form a chips coalition among like-minded countries resulting in their collective abilities to generate scientific breakthroughs that can be translated into military and economic advantages that will preserve U.S. dominance and the existing rules-based order. Beijing is aware of this challenge and has attempted to reduce its reliance on the U.S. and Western states through its Made in China 2025 strategy and Dual Circulation Strategy. Whether these initiatives will be sufficient to outmaneuver U.S. initiatives to dominate semi-conductors and ultimately AI and other sensitive technologies is yet to be determined. Role of ASEAN, Japan, and the EU Chinese analysts also pay close attention to the role of regional players such as ASEAN, Japan, and the EU in the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. They believe that these countries have a significant influence on the balance of power in the region and that their relationships with the United States and China are critical. Japan’s release in December 2022 of three strategy documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Program aims to uphold the current rules-based order and prevent the emergence of Chinese hegemony in the IndoPacific region. Meanwhile, the new Washington Declaration between the United States and the Republic of Korea (RoK) commits to engage in deeper, cooperative decision-making on nuclear deterrence, including through enhanced dialogue and information sharing regarding growing nuclear threats to the ROK and the region. The recent meeting between U.S. President Biden and Philippine President Marcos reaffirms the United States’ ironclad alliance commitments to the Philippines, underscoring that an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific, including in the South China Sea, would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.- Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.”. These are explicit examples of how U.S. allies, through their cooperation and partnerships with the U.S., are aiming to preserve U.S. hegemony. In short, Chinese analysts argue that the United States is seeking to use its relationships with these countries to contain China’s rise, while China is seeking to build closer relationships with its neighbors and BRI partners to expand its influence and build win-win relationships based on its Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Lastly, U.S. and ASEAN watchers in China believe that the United States is losing influence in the region, particularly with ASEAN countries, and that China is poised to fill the power vacuum owing to its extensive economic ties in the region, ties that many in Southeast Asia are dependent on for sustainable development despite reservations over the possible negative ramifications of increased Chinese economic and diplomatic influence in the region. Heft of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) Sensitive to the changing power balances and what this means for China’s ability to achieve its core national interests, China places enormous weight on Comprehensive National Power (CNP) as a key measure of a country’s overall strength and capability in all aspects of national development, including economic, military, technological, cultural, and diplomatic power as Hu Angang and Men Honghua write in their article title “The rising of modern China: Comprehensive national power and grand strategy”. The concept of CNP has been used by Chinese leaders since the 1980s to assess China’s relative strength compared to other countries, particularly the United States. In recent years, China has focused on increasing its CNP as part of its strategic competition with the U.S. Beijing aims to surpass the U.S. in terms of overall power and influence, believing that a higher CNP will enable the country to better protect its national interests, enhance its global influence, and achieve its long-term strategic goals. To increase its CNP, China has pursued a range of policies and initiatives. One of the key areas of focus has been economic development, with China becoming the world’s second-largest economy and a major player in global trade and investment. Through the Made in China 2025, the Belt Road Initiative (BRI), and the Dual Circulation Model, China has also invested heavily in science and technology, with a particular emphasis on emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 5G networks.  In addition, China has modernized its military and expanded its global military presence based on the civil-military fusion (MCF), with the goal of becoming a world-class military power by the middle of the century. China has also pursued a more assertive foreign policy, seeking to expand its influence in key regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Concurrently, China has also sought to promote its soft power, through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to enhance connectivity and economic cooperation between China and other countries. China has also sought to promote its culture and values through the Confucius Institutes and its latest Global Civilization Initiative calling for “called for respecting the diversity of civilizations, advocating the common values of humanity, valuing the inheritance and innovation of civilizations, and strengthening international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation.”  China’s focus on increasing its CNP is driven by its desire to become a major global power and to challenge the U.S.’ dominant position in the international system. While China’s rise has brought many benefits to the country and the world, it has also raised concerns among some countries, particularly the U.S., about the potential implications of China’s growing power and influence. This is especially true as we have seen a growing track record of economic coercion, grey zone tactics, and rejecting international law such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s July 2016 decision against its claims in the South China Sea.Conclusion Chinese analysts clearly view the relationship between the United States and China through a complex lens. They see the relationship with the United States as one of the most important in the world and believe that it will continue to shape the trajectory of global politics and economics for years to come. While there are significant challenges and tensions in the relationship between the two countries, Chinese analysts also see opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, particularly in areas such as climate change and global health.